Military Air Tactics

☝️ Europe does not need armies that can instantly defeat Russia, but ones that can survive the opening shock of a high-intensity war. Danish military analyst Anders Puck Nielsen delivers a stark message about the future of European defense The era of Western militaries relying on small, expensive high-quality forces and maneuver warfare is over. For decades, Western defense planning focused on expeditionary warfare, banking on superior quality and rapid maneuver to avoid attritional grinds at all costs. As Anders Puck Nielsen points out, that approach is obsolete in a high-intensity war against a peer adversary like Russia. Attritional warfare will dominate from the very beginning, and European armies must be structured to survive that opening blow. In this new environment, mass matters just as much as quality. The military that enters the war will not be the same military that finishes it, because the initial force will suffer massive losses and have to be replaced. Europe does not need a pristine peacetime army designed to defeat Russia in a single decisive battle. It needs an armed force built for endurance: one that can survive the first phase, absorb heavy losses, and rapidly scale up production to rebuild itself for the long fight. Unmanned systems will be crucial to preserving precious manpower during that devastating opening phase. However, as Nielsen notes, drones cannot completely replace traditional armor. Infantry still needs the protection of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles to survive on a transparent battlefield. At the same time, defensive measures alone will never be enough. Russia's growing deep-strike capabilities pose an existential threat that air defense alone cannot solve. Europe must develop and scale up its own long-range strike capacity to hit back into Russian territory at scale and degrade their war machine. This shift also reshapes the naval domain. Massive, expensive frigates may no longer make as much sense for contested narrow seas like the Baltic during the opening phase of a conflict, even if they remain useful for expeditionary roles. Old systems are not suddenly obsolete, but their role is changing. As Nielsen emphasizes, Europe must embrace mass, adaptation, cheap production, and rapid innovation. - Joni Askola

🛡️ 𝐍𝐨 𝐖𝐡𝐢𝐭𝐞 𝐒𝐰𝐚𝐧 𝐢𝐬 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐠 — 𝐙𝐚𝐥𝐮𝐳𝐡𝐧𝐲𝐢 𝐨𝐧 𝐰𝐚𝐫, 𝐞𝐱𝐩𝐨𝐫𝐭𝐬, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐯𝐢𝐯𝐚𝐥 🎙️ “This is a real war to exhaustion. A high-tech war for survival.” — General Valerii Zaluzhnyi At the forum “Export of Security: Ukrainian Technological Weapons in the World”, Zaluzhnyi delivered a stark message: there will be no miracle peace, no return to 1991 or 2022 without breaking Russia’s ability to wage war. 📦 On defense exports, Zaluzhnyi outlines 3 core dimensions: ▪️ A source of resources for survival and growth ▪️ A driver of innovation in military design and application ▪️ A strategic tool for integrating into future alliances through experience-sharing ⚔️ On the nature of modern war: ▪️ Ukraine cannot rely on manpower — it must win with low-cost, high-tech asymmetry ▪️ The only path forward is to break Russia’s military-economic engine ▪️ This means: – Making the cost of war unbearable for Russia – Undermining Russia’s scientific and social base – Continuing economic development in wartime, as Israel does 🧭 On Ukraine’s current challenges: ▪️ Limited R&D and coordination across key sectors (ISR, air defense, unmanned systems) ▪️ Ukraine is losing the innovation race in areas where it once led ▪️ No systematic approach to scaling, doctrine design, or organizational integration ▪️ Tech exports must go beyond hardware — they must include: – New weapons + new methods of employment – New doctrines, training models, and force structures – A redefinition of how we budget for security 🤝 On what must be done: ▪️ Build a national innovation-based survival policy ▪️ Forge international tech partnerships to co-develop, co-produce, and co-scale ▪️ Coordinate state, private sector, and civil society ▪️ Balance military urgency with economic sustainability “No weapon that’s effective now will remain effective tonight.” Zaluzhnyi’s message is clear: Ukraine must become a global exporter of defense thinking — not just defense hardware. This requires structure, speed, and statecraft. #Zaluzhnyi #Ukraine #DefenseInnovation #WarEconomy #SecurityExports #SurvivalStrategy #ISR #AirDefense #DoctrineDevelopment #MilitaryTransformation #TechSovereignty #DefenseIndustry #ModernWarfare

Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, Chair of the NATO Military Committee, said a phrase that sounds quiet but carries significant weight: the possibility of a more assertive — even pre-emptive — response by the Alliance to Russian cyberattacks, sabotage, and airspace violations is no longer taboo. He acknowledges that NATO faces more ethical and legal constraints than an aggressor state, which makes defense more difficult. Yet at the same time, he hints that the Alliance is preparing to move away from its “traditional way of thinking.” This signal should be read on three levels. First, the Admiral is talking about a shift in understanding defense itself: from reactive to proactive. This implies actions that may precede the next attack if there is reason to believe it is imminent. Not escalation — but a refusal to remain a target. The second level is acknowledging the weak point of democracies. NATO cannot act the way Russia does. There are parliaments, courts, legal frameworks, and decision-making processes. This is a foundation, but also a brake. The adversary exploits it, striking in the grey zone where it is difficult to define a clear threshold for response. Dragone is essentially saying: we no longer want to be hostages to our own decency. The third level is a warning. Russia must understand that cable sabotage, attacks on infrastructure, or airspace violations will no longer be treated as minor incidents. The Alliance is preparing to view them as a phase of conflict, not as “inconveniences.” This is not a change of statute, but a change of mood — and in the West, mood often precedes policy. As for practical consequences, the most likely scenarios of such a “more assertive response” look measured but firm. They may include quickly neutralizing the sources of cyberattacks before they cause damage, or temporarily disabling the infrastructure from which hostile operations are conducted. Preventive actions in the air are also possible — from forced landings to interceptions with demonstrative escort. This also includes intelligence operations against sabotage groups on European territory — not after the fact, but during preparation. This does not look like a path to a direct war between NATO and Russia. It is rather an attempt to strip Moscow of the illusion that hybrid attacks will remain unpunished until they become catastrophic. The Alliance is tired of living in the mode of waiting for the next strike — and is finally saying so out loud.

Ukraine is the C-student, the U.S. is the straight-A student. But the U.S. must learn from Ukraine speed, cheap production, and asymmetric war. Michael Brown and Matt Kaplan write in Foreign Affairs that Washington must draw hard lessons from Ukraine to prepare for China. The U.S. bet on short wars and exquisite systems after 1991. Ukraine shows the opposite: wars are long, attritional, software-driven. Mass and adaptation beat prestige platforms. Ukraine started the war with one small warship. Russia had a fleet. Ukraine destroyed or disabled 25+ Russian ships — about one-third of the Black Sea Fleet — including the cruiser Moskva. Blockade broken and grain exports resumed. In spring 2025, Ukraine smuggled 117 FPV drones near five Russian airfields. Cost per drone: a few thousand dollars. Damage: up to 30% of Russia’s strategic bombers. Estimated cost to Moscow: $7 billion. Drone war now evolves in three-week cycles. Ukraine attacks. Russia jams. Ukraine adds computer vision. Russia expands jammers. Software updates decide survival within days, not years. Cheap drones — hundreds of dollars — replaced $100,000 Excalibur precision shells. Precision moved to small teams near the frontline. Scale replaced elegance. Contrast this with the U.S.: F-35 — 20 years development, $80m per jet. Ford-class carrier — $13bn. B-21 — in development since early 2010s. For the cost of one aircraft carrier, the Pentagon could buy 13 million drones — nearly 100 per U.S. infantryman. Yet only 20% of the $900bn defense budget goes to procurement. 17% goes to developing new exquisite platforms. China’s shipbuilding capacity is 200× that of the U.S. In a prolonged war, manufacturing wins. Quantity has a quality of its own. Imagine a Pacific conflict where satellites are jammed, carriers are targeted, logistics degrade, and drones swarm at scale. Would exquisite platforms survive attrition? Or would cheap, modular systems dominate? Brown and Kaplan argue: — War-game asymmetric threats seriously. — Rebuild stockpiles. — Invest in modular systems. — Use 3D printing and scalable drone production. — Design for replacement, not perfection. Russia planned a three-day war. It has lasted four years. The next conflict will not wait for 20-year procurement cycles. If you were the Pentagon, what would you build first — another carrier, or a factory that produces millions of drones?

Former CIA Director Petraeus: U.S. success in the Persian Gulf is a source of pride, but not a reason for complacency. Ukraine offers the key lessons: modern warfare involves drones, AI, and precision-strike capabilities. That is where the real challenges and the future of warfare lie. The battlefield in Ukraine is far more complex than the Persian Gulf. Drones are jammed, intercepted, and quickly replaced. This is a war on an industrial scale, where mass, resilience, and innovation are decisive. Without a conventional navy, Ukraine was able to use maritime drones to disable a significant portion of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and force it to retreat. Cheap unmanned systems can break traditional naval power. U.S. and Israeli operations in the Persian Gulf took place under much easier conditions, with control over communications and navigation. The enemy is unable to operate on a massive scale across all domains. Unlike in Ukraine, where a constant, large-scale, and adaptive war is underway. Lesson #1 — Volume is key. Ukraine produces them by the millions, up to 7 million a year. The U.S. doesn’t even come close to that scale. Lesson #2 — Speed of adaptation. The advantage goes to whoever learns faster. In Ukraine, drones are updated weekly, hardware every few weeks, and tactics change just as quickly. Lesson #3 — Resilience. Systems must operate under electronic warfare and without communication. This leads to autonomous drones and swarms capable of penetrating air defense systems. Even modern systems are already struggling; autonomous ones will pose an even greater challenge. The U.S. Army needs rapid and radical changes. New approaches must transform everything: from training to procurement. The U.S. demonstrated its strength in the Gulf; Ukraine is facing a real war under pressure. This should not lull us into complacency but rather heighten the sense of urgency. General David H. Petraeus, US Army (Ret.)

Part 6. Cyber before tanks — this is how Russia wages war. Long before missiles hit infrastructure or drones fill the sky, Russian services are already inside networks: government, power grids, logistics routes, satellites, banks, media. Ukraine has lived through this for a decade. Estonia did in 2007. Georgia did in 2008. Europe felt the shockwaves of NotPetya. NATO satellite links were targeted on day one of the invasion. This is not “IT disruption.” It is pre-invasion shaping operations. A doctrine where non-kinetic tools prepare the battlefield for kinetic assault. And it is happening right now across Europe — ports, energy, telecoms, critical infrastructure. Cyber is the first front. If we wait for tanks to appear, we are already late. Part 6: Cyber Before Tanks – Hybrid Doctrine in Action How Russia built this playbook. How Ukraine adapted. And what Europe must do — now. #NATO #CyberSecurity #HybridWarfare #Ukraine #Deterrence #CriticalInfrastructure #C2 #CyberDefense #InfoOps #Resilience

Ukraine Deploys All-Robot Drone Force to Defend Against 8,000 Russian Troops Overview: In a groundbreaking military operation, Ukraine’s 13th National Guard Brigade launched an all-robot, combined-arms drone attack against a significantly larger Russian force in Kharkiv Oblast. This marks one of the first recorded instances of an entirely robotic combat force being deployed in active warfare, blending aerial and ground-based drones to defend a critical five-mile frontline stretch against 8,000 Russian soldiers. The Ukrainian military’s innovative strategy highlights both the technological prowess of its drone warfare capabilities and the growing challenges of maintaining sufficient manpower in prolonged conflict. How the All-Robot Drone Team Operated: 1. Combined-Arms Coordination: • The drone team operated similarly to a traditional combined-arms military force, integrating surveillance, offense, and logistics roles. 2. Key Drone Units: • Multi-Rotor Copters: Equipped to carry heavy payloads, including anti-tank mines. • FPV (First-Person View) Drones: Used for precision strikes and kamikaze missions. • Surveillance Drones: Provided real-time intelligence and targeting data. 3. Tactical Deployment: • Dozens of unmanned ground and aerial vehicles coordinated simultaneously across a small frontline segment to disrupt Russian advances. National Guard Spokesperson: “This operation demonstrated the power of robotic synergy—ground and aerial drones working in tandem to secure key defensive positions.” Strategic and Technological Significance: 1. Force Multiplier: • Drones effectively compensated for Ukrainian manpower shortages on this section of the frontline. 2. Scalable Tactics: • The success of this operation suggests the potential for larger-scale drone deployments in future engagements. 3. Cost-Effective Defense: • Compared to traditional manned operations, drones are more cost-efficient and reduce the risk of human casualties. 4. Real-Time Adaptability: • Surveillance drones provided instant battlefield intelligence, enabling quick adjustments to enemy movements. Concerns Over Manpower Shortages: While the use of an all-robot drone force is a technological milestone, analysts caution that it might also signal strain on Ukrainian human resources: The Takeaway: Ukraine’s deployment of an all-robot drone force against 8,000 Russian troops represents a milestone in military innovation and a strategic adaptation to mounting human resource challenges. While the success of the operation demonstrates the immense potential of unmanned combat systems, it also highlights the fragility of Ukraine’s manpower reserves in a prolonged war. This development may set the stage for an intensified drone arms race, pushing both Ukraine and Russia to prioritize autonomous systems in future military planning. The Kharkiv operation could very well be remembered as a turning point in the evolution of modern warfare.

Just finished reading a genuinely valuable piece of primary source material — the 4th installment of Generalization of Combat Experience in the SMO through May 2026 by A.V. Markin, published by the G.I. Boyarinov Fund in Moscow. Compiled from direct interviews with Russian soldiers and officers fighting between September 2025 and May 2026. What makes this document stand out is how candidly it captures the tactical realities of drone-centric warfare. The shift away from traditional infantry maneuver is striking: small 2-3 person groups, mechanized micro-breakthroughs, and a near-total reliance on FPV and fiber-optic UAVs to both shape and exploit the close fight. Counter-UAV targeting has become its own discipline, with detailed accounts of crew detection sequencing, antenna destruction prioritization, and perimeter mining of drone operator positions. The analytical appendices are equally worth your time. One examines how KPI-driven metrics mirror failures seen in U.S. Army institutional culture — what Markin calls "the American mistake" — and the other challenges the relevance of prescriptive field manuals in an environment where tactical innovation outpaces formal doctrine on a weekly basis. If you're tracking how adversarial forces are adapting in real time, this is essential reading. The implications for U.S. counter-UAS development, small unit training, and force structure are hard to ignore.

🚁 Ukrainian strikes on Russian supply trucks and pontoon crossings near Crimea highlight a fundamental principle of modern warfare: logistics is often the true center of gravity. 🔥 After repeated attacks damaged the Chonhar Bridge, Russian forces were forced to rely on temporary pontoon crossings to sustain the occupation of Crimea. These improvised routes create predictable chokepoints that are difficult to conceal, defend, or rapidly replace. 🎯 Every bridge, ferry, and crossing eliminated increases friction within the Russian logistics network. Fuel, ammunition, reinforcements, and maintenance support must all move through an increasingly constrained set of routes, making them attractive targets for Ukrainian drone operators conducting sustained interdiction campaigns. ⚓ The broader lesson is that modern unmanned systems are reshaping operational maneuver. Rather than focusing solely on frontline attrition, Ukraine continues to demonstrate how precision strikes against critical infrastructure can degrade an adversary’s ability to sustain forces across an entire theater. #SlavaUkraini #StandWithUkraine #ArmUkraineNow #DeOppressoLiber #Ukraine #DroneWarfare #Logistics #DeepStrike #Crimea #MilitaryStrategy