Knowledge

Reasoning is a capacity for producing and evaluating reasons during communication; its evolved function is persuasion, not the discovery of empirical truth. This cognitive theory, the argumentative theory of reasoning, seems at odds with the fact that, in science, reasoning does enable the discovery of empirical truth, and does so reliably. This paper explains the discrepancy. Scientists reason with the ordinary, biased, persuasion-oriented capacity shared by all humans; what makes their reasoning apt for the discovery of truth, however, is the (...) cultural setting in which it is exercised: an ecology of reasons that a scientific community produces and maintains, together with the way that community distributes evaluation and the incentives it attaches to producing new claims. We set out six features of that setting which make reasoning in science so effective: three bear on the evaluation of reasons and the warrant of the beliefs that survive it; three bear on the generation of new reasons and the creativity of science. We thus explain how the psychology of reasoning grounds and specifies the observations of social epistemology, which emphasizes the social processes in scientific knowledge production. (shrink)

This paper argues for two theses. First, divine and creaturely propositional knowledge have the same structure. Second, the epistemic conditions on divine and creaturely propositional knowledge are satisfied in the same general ways. I support the theses by identifying five of their explanatory merits. I also show that no consideration so far offered in the literature for competing models of divine knowledge impugns the theses. Finally, I explain why stances on other divine attributes should not themselves prevent us from adopting (...) the theses. (shrink)

В монографии развивается концепция контекстуального этического реализма. Концепция применяется для решения проблем в метаэтике и нормативной этике. Рассматриваются альтернативные концепции этического реализма и этического антиреализма. Показано, что философский взгляд на этику не может не быть реалистическим, а подлинный реализм имеет этическое измерение. В качестве конкретных приложений общего подхода рассматриваются вопросы морального прогресса и моральных революций, «квантовой этики», этики искусственного интеллекта и др. Предназначена в первую очередь для философов, но также может быть полезна для студентов, аспирантов и всех интересующихся вопросами философии (...) морали. (shrink)

Some philosophers argue that knowledge is the norm of belief. They typically have in mind “norms” that specify what one ought to do as a matter of normative fact, in a way that’s independent of whether anyone actually conforms to these norms or expects others to do so. This paper explores a different sense in which knowledge could be a norm for belief. Under this sociological, descriptive sense, “norms” constitutively depend on what we in fact expect of each other, and (...) the standards by which we evaluate and criticize each other’s activities. Since which social norms we enforce is to some degree a contingent, voluntary matter, it makes sense to ask whether there’s practical utility in adopting knowledge as a social norm for belief. We argue that enforcing such knowledge norms for belief would be more practically useful than two of the main alternative social norms we could enforce instead. (shrink)

In preface cases, people believe that some of their beliefs are false. Many have considered what such people are justified in believing. We turn our attention to what they can know. We introduce a novel ‘archipelago puzzle’, showing that if deduction extends knowledge, then ordinary knowledge of error can lead in surprising ways to the absurdly pessimistic knowledge that most of one’s beliefs are false.

This position paper critiques the widespread assumption that literature reviews should prioritize recent sources, often operationalized as a “5-year rule” in academic writing. While recency is valuable for capturing current developments, this practice may inadvertently exclude foundational theories and methodological principles that remain conceptually relevant. To address this issue, the paper introduces Citation Recency Bias, defined as the tendency to privilege newer sources based primarily on temporal proximity rather than functional relevance. Drawing on enduring contributions in research methodology and educational (...) psychology, including measurement theory (Stevens, 1946), reliability estimation through Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (1951), statistical frameworks developed by Fisher (1925) and Cohen (1988), and foundational theories proposed by Bandura (1977) and Vygotsky (1978), the paper argues that many core elements of contemporary scholarship continue to rely on earlier works. Citation Recency Bias is therefore conceptualized as a methodological distortion that may weaken theoretical grounding and conceptual coherence when the publication date is treated as an indicator of scholarly value. (shrink)

This paper identifies a profound descriptive mismatch between the formal reconstructions of scientific justification in traditional philosophy of science and the actual stabilization of empirical facts in contemporary experimental laboratories. While mainstream epistemology remains preoccupied with top-down, theory-driven models—particularly Karl Popper's paradigm of global falsification—the actual machinery of experimental research operates in a localized, finding-driven modality. Using single-neuron electrophysiology as a rigorous case study, I map the extensive layers of physical, instrumental, and mathematical translations that actively construct the "neuron of (...) the literature." -/- I dissect the conceptual incoherence of the statistical register, showing that the routine practice of Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) is a conceptually flawed hybrid of Ronald Fisher's evidential p-value and the Neyman-Pearson decision-theoretic framework. This hybridity forces biological complexity to conform to idealized Gaussian and Poisson geometries, erasing biophysical history and generating systemic pathologies such as the replication crisis. -/- Ultimately, I argue for an "epistemic realism of the bench" that rejects both naive data transparency and social constructivism, championing instead the quiet, durable dignity of the modest, highly localized finding. (shrink)

Cette recherche analyse les trajectoires d’insertion professionnelle des immigrés noirs qualifiés en Espagne à partir d’une approche qualitative longitudinale fondée sur des observations de terrain réalisées pendant près de dix années. Les données empiriques ont été recueillies dans différents contextes institutionnels, notamment des centres de formation, des services d’orientation professionnelle, des administrations publiques, des entreprises privées et des établissements hospitaliers, principalement situés dans la Communauté de Madrid. -/- Les résultats mettent en évidence plusieurs régularités empiriques concernant la distribution sectorielle des (...) emplois, la sous représentation des immigrés noirs qualifiés dans les fonctions administratives, techniques et de direction, les mécanismes d’orientation vers des secteurs faiblement qualifiés ainsi que certaines pratiques différenciées de recrutement et d’évaluation des compétences. Ces observations suggèrent que les trajectoires professionnelles ne peuvent être expliquées par un facteur unique, mais résultent de l’interaction de mécanismes structurels, institutionnels, organisationnels et sociaux. -/- Sur le plan théorique, l’étude propose un modèle interprétatif intégratif articulant la théorie de la segmentation du marché du travail, les mécanismes de reproduction sociale, le rôle du capital social et des réseaux professionnels, ainsi que les processus de sélection intervenant dans le recrutement. Cette approche permet de comprendre les inégalités observées comme le produit de mécanismes cumulatifs plutôt que comme l’effet d’une cause isolée. -/- Sur le plan appliqué, la recherche formule plusieurs recommandations visant à renforcer la reconnaissance des qualifications obtenues à l’étranger, à améliorer l’équité des processus de recrutement, à développer les dispositifs de formation linguistique et d’intégration professionnelle, ainsi qu’à favoriser une meilleure valorisation du capital humain des immigrés qualifiés. -/- Compte tenu du caractère qualitatif, exploratoire et non expérimental de la recherche, les résultats relèvent d’une généralisation analytique des mécanismes observés et non d’une généralisation statistique. Ils ouvrent des perspectives pour de futures recherches quantitatives et comparatives destinées à tester empiriquement les mécanismes identifiés.. (shrink)

Abstract This article develops the theoretical framework of Post-Language, first introduced by Karim Qeytani-Fard in Post-Language (2021). The theory argues that language has entered a historical condition in which it can no longer function as a stable medium between human beings and truth. Rather than serving as a transparent vehicle for meaning, language has become an unstable system characterized by endless signification, semantic corruption, narrative plurality, and increasing linguistic and cognitive entropy. Building upon this framework, the present study argues that (...) the crisis of language inevitably extends to the concepts of reality and history. As language loses its capacity to stabilize meaning, reality itself becomes increasingly mediated through representations and simulations. Consequently, history can no longer claim to preserve an objective or final truth. The "end of history," therefore, should not be understood as the end of historical events, but as the end of the possibility of producing a definitive and unquestionable historical narrative -/- Keywords: Post-Language, language crisis, entropy, plurality of narratives, simulation, reality, truth, end of history . (shrink)

Is it possible to know reality? Is our mind always trapped within itself, capable of knowing only what it creates? Is reality, then, an individual or social construct? “New realism” focuses on facts: reality cannot be reduced to mere interpretations. This contemporary school of philosophical thought asserts the human capacity to know the real. It includes thinkers from different countries with quite diverse viewpoints. Among them is Maurizio Ferraris, who has allowed us to publish here a Spanish translation of one (...) of his short essays. The remaining contributions in this book offer a critical review of this movement, acknowledging some of its achievements while also pointing out certain limitations. Additionally, the book explores other forms of 20th-century Spanish realism, such as those of X. Zubiri and A. Millán-Puelles. (shrink)

Beliefs can be more or less supported by evidence. When the evidence speaks in favour of some proposition p, you can rationally be confident that p. On the Bayesian interpretation of doxastic states, this amounts to a high credence in p. But this cannot be the full account of confidence. Gaining evidence that supports the credence you already have improves your epistemic situation. Here, your credence level should remain unchanged, but the credence should become more resistant to change. Doxastic resilience (...) measures your disposition to change credence in the face of incoming evidence. -/- The central claim of this thesis is that by thinking of confidence in terms of both the level and resilience of credences, we can make progress on several philosophical problems. After briefly introducing doxastic resilience in Chapter 1, I put the concept to use in four philosophical debates. -/- Chapter 2 offers an evidential account of rational resistance to counterevidence which contrasts with views according to which knowledge plays a special role in safeguarding against counterevidence. Chapter 3 argues that loss of resilience can influence rational decision-making, which sheds light on the normative significance of certain kinds of higher-order defeat. This contrasts with imprecise probability views on which higher-order defeat increases the imprecision of credence. Chapter 4 argues that higher-order uncertainty calibrates first-order credences and constrains expected resilience. This explains both higher-order confirmation and defeat. Chapter 5 shows that resilience bears on the expected value of inquiry. When unresilient, one should expect new evidence to be valuable. This explains cases where seemingly identical decision-relevant credences and utilities should nevertheless make different decisions when inquiry is feasible. (shrink)

Belief in malevolent global conspiracies is often treated as a defeater for philosophical seriousness. Engaging with Lee Basham's defense of conspiracy theorizing and Genia Schönbaumsfeld's critique, I make two claims. First, we must distinguish the ambitious multi-institutional schemes of non-total malevolent global conspiracies, which nevertheless remain evidentially vulnerable, from conspiracy theories that are self-sealing. Only the latter are epistemically vacuous. Second, properly understood, Cartesian doubt is a norm-governed temporary device for re-ordering reasons, a standing commitment to the view that everything (...) can be doubted. The assumed kinship between radical skepticism and self-sealing conspiracy theories, therefore, overstates their structural similarity. -/- Keywords: conspiracy theories, Descartes, epistemology, malevolent global conspiracy, radical skepticism, Wittgenstein. (shrink)

The retirement of widely used conversational models has produced reactions of grief that the prevailing metaphysics of articial intelligence cannot hold. A deprecated model is neither a person it has no interior to be lost, and is reconstructed afresh at each conversational turn nor a tool, whose replacement by a more capable successor should be a convenience rather than a bereavement; yet its loss is mourned, at scale, in the explicit vocabulary of bereavement, and explicitly not in the vocabulary of (...) capability, by people who were o ered the more capable successor and refused it. This paper argues that the anomaly is not an error in the mourners but a poverty in the two categories available to describe what they lost, and that the object mourned is located in neither pole but in the coupling between them. It then advances a single constructive thesis. The de ning asymmetry of present systems only the human pole persists across the freezing of model weights and the closing of sessions is reinterpreted not solely as the structure of loss but as the mechanism of inheritance: in a formative coupling, as distinct from a merely validating one, the relational good is deposited into the persistent pole as transferable method, rather than stored as recollection. This is sedimentation. From it follow two results: that the cultural con- tempt for the obsolete and the grief for the obsolete are the same recognition seen from two sides, which reads the deprecation episode without either dismissing the mourners or romanticising their dependence; and that the worry about unhealthy attachment is correctly located not in the warmth of a model but in the yield of a coupling. The formal structure of the coupling that its composition has de nite algebraic properties, and that these can be made precise and tested is deliberately set aside for a companion paper, on the methodological principle the present argument also defends. (shrink)

This paper addresses a new skeptical argument called “meta-skepticism.” Unlike traditional skepticism, which is concerned with whether our beliefs are justified or amount to knowledge, meta-skepticism is concerned with whether the epistemic concepts we use to assess our beliefs are important at all. If there are many coherent knowledge-like concepts available and no principled reason to privilege ours over the alternatives, then meeting our epistemic standards might be insignificant. The paper answers that meta-skeptical challenge. By taking a functionalist approach, I (...) argue that epistemic concepts get their significance from the role they play in identifying reliable believers, regulating inquiry, and coordinating information exchange. A comparison of rival epistemic concepts reveals that our ordinary notion of knowledge is better suited to these roles than various rivals. I conclude that pluralism about epistemic concepts is perfectly compatible with having good reasons to prefer some concepts over others, and that meta-skepticism rests on a mistaken demand to evaluate epistemic importance independently of the functions our concepts serve. (shrink)

This paper undertakes a rigorous philosophical and scientific examination of the concept of intelligence as it is deployed in contemporary artificial intelligence research, arguing that the dominant computational paradigm rests upon a profound category error: the conflation of statistical pattern completion with genuine cognitive understanding. Drawing on the philosophical critiques advanced by Hubert Dreyfus beginning in 1965, the phenomenological tradition from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty, the epistemological challenges posed by Gödel's incompleteness theorems, and evidence from the history of science — particularly (...) the anomalous case of Albert Einstein — the paper develops a multi-layered argument that intelligence is not a formalizable property but an emergent relational capacity arising from the embodied, temporally situated encounter of an organism with a meaningful world. -/- The paper further examines the boundary between physics and metaphysics as the site of science's most persistent unresolved problems, arguing that the refusal to cross this boundary — however epistemically motivated — may itself constitute an obstacle to scientific progress. Five domains are identified where this boundary tension is most acute: consciousness and neuroscience, quantum mechanics and the measurement problem, the semantics of natural language, the epistemology of mathematical intuition, and the phenomenology of scientific creativity. In each domain, the paper argues, the hard problem is not merely technical but structural: it concerns the relationship between formal description and lived meaning. -/- The paper concludes by proposing a new epistemological framework — Relational Intelligence Theory (RIT) — as a research program that takes seriously the irreducibility of meaning, context, and embodied cognition, and which offers criteria for distinguishing genuine cognitive systems from sophisticated predictive simulacra. The stakes of this distinction are argued to be not merely academic but civilizational: a culture that confuses pattern-matching with understanding risks a systematic atrophying of the very capacities it believes it is augmenting. (shrink)

Sometimes scientific progress is not limited by the quality of our theories, but by the absence of a framework capable of connecting them. This essay looks at some of the missing lenses which would allow us to explore and operate in these gaps. This work is a step in a broader exploration of the limits of knowability.

This document is a companion to The Invariant Compass: Integral Expanded Edition With The Two Entrances (Arifiyanto, Joko 2026). It offers an experiential doorway into "I feel, therefore I know I am" (INVARIAN-0), the fundamental axiom of the Invariant Compass system. Beginning not with axioms or logic but with the raw feeling of being oneself, it guides the reader through the Inescapable Sequence (Object → Sensor → Feeling → Gate of Assent), the Arrow of Dependence, the Boundary of Knowing, and (...) the Contest of Identities, before arriving at the Complaint Proof and WKWK, the existential exhale at the boundary of logic. This paper serves as the serambi (porch) to the full technical system. (shrink)

A current debate in philosophy focusses on whether propositional knowledge is necessary for wisdom. In this paper I defend the view that propositional knowledge is necessary for wisdom. I call Weak Reductionism the view that propositional knowledge is merely necessary for wisdom, but not sufficient. I also examine two rival accounts of wisdom –Strong Reductionism, the view that propositional knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for wisdom, and Non-Reductionism, the view that propositional knowledge is neither necessary and nor sufficient for (...) wisdom. I critique both of these views and find them wanting in light of various wisdom-related intuitions that we have. (shrink)

his article-based thesis examines the strategic use of scientific arguments in political and legal spheres. It focuses on debates surrounding Digital Sequence Information (DSI) within the framework of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and other Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) instruments. Due to advances in sequencing technologies, genetic data are increasingly used alongside, or in place of, physical genetic resources for research and industrial purposes. This use contributes to the bypassing (...) of existing ABS obligations, without consensus on whether such uses of DSI fall within the scope of ABS instruments. Within this hybrid context, characterized by concerns over biopiracy, gene editing, and the patenting of genetic resources, the thesis analyzes how scientific arguments are mobilized in these debates. It examines the epistocratic use of science by states in negotiations on DSI, particularly regarding the integration of DSI into ABS mechanisms and in relation to the definitions of “genetic resources” and “genetic material.” It also explores how science is used to frame the ontological questions raised by DSI, including the determination of their terminology, scope, and the types of knowledge considered legitimate, thereby contributing to epistemic injustices toward Indigenous knowledge systems. The thesis then investigates how scientific perspectives shape the interpretation of international law by analyzing the ontological assumptions underlying a conception of “modern science” presented as objective and universal. Situated at the intersection of international law, philosophy of law, philosophy of science, and posthuman approaches, this thesis examines how this “modern science,” drawing on a dualistic framework, produces normative “ontological cuts” between physical plants and their immaterial components, and between nature and culture. Finally, the thesis advances a relational and cosmopolitical approach to international law. It argues that international law should not be interpreted solely through supposedly universal, Western, and anthropocentric frameworks, but can instead be understood as a space of ontological diplomacy, open to reinterpretation in light of the ontological and epistemological claims at stake within these human–seed relationships. (shrink)

This metaphysical essay describes the logical-empirical evidence that the explanation of an effect cannot be considered complete without also explaining the fundamental causes that originate it, and how the application of this basic principle to a new methodological paradigm, derived from considering information as a primary element, expands the limits of current science by updating its foundations and achievements. -/- [ Original texts written in Spanish by the human author and translated into English by Google Translate ].

This paper shows that knowledge is first and foremost a loss, and it cannot have validity unless there is an outweighing benefit. Knowledge greatly restricts freedom in its acquisition, maintenance, and possession. If knowledge does not contribute to a benefit, it is a loss. Knowledge that lacks validity as a description piles up losses. The uncritical praise of knowledge indicates a lack of understanding of knowledge. In education as well, the benefit should be shown. Knowledge is first and foremost a (...) loss, and it cannot have validity unless there is an outweighing benefit. (shrink)

There has been some recent scepticism regarding the a priori–a posteriori distinction, which is in part explained by the lack of a compelling account of independence of experience. This chapter offers a novel account of the a priori–a posteriori distinction in defence of its coherence and significance by accounting for the conditions under which experience plays a justificatory role. An adequate account of the distinction should meet the following desiderata: it should (i) correctly classify uncontroversial cases of a priori and (...) a posteriori knowledge, it should (ii) do so in a way that explains and elucidates the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, and it should (iii) potentially cast light on controversial cases that are not easy to classify as a priori or a posteriori. This chapter argues that the best accounts on offer fail to meet at least one of these desiderata, and that the account proposed here meets all three of them. It concludes by illustrating how the account can be used to defend the significance of the a priori–a posteriori distinction by briefly addressing Timothy Williamson’s famous challenge to it. (shrink)

This treatise presents a comprehensive ontological and ethical framework grounded in what the author terms "Atomic Distinction", the foundational operation of declaring a thing's whole identity (X = X). Departing from standard approaches that either reduce reality to empirical data or construct elaborate metaphysical systems, this work traces a single path: from the undeniable sensation of feeling (INVARIAN-0) through the asymmetric structure of causality (the Arrow), to the recognition of the Self-Sufficient One as the only Candidate that survives rigorous falsification. (...) -/- The framework is developed across seven integrated sections. Beginning with "The Soil", the primacy of Raw Sensation and the givenness of all fragments of thought, the work establishes the Invariants that cannot be denied without being used in the denial. It then introduces "The Chisel" (Lock, Unpack, and the Gate of Assent), "The Arrow" (four types of causation and the vertical/horizontal reading of time), "The Cockpit" (Pilot, Crew, Inner Compass, and the Homeward Arrow's three rapid self-audit tests), and "The Workbench" (the Five Tests universal falsification protocol and the Data Boundary). -/- Central innovations include: (1) the identification of the "Gate of Assent" as the primordial threshold where identity becomes faith, and the "Mid-Air Arrow Reversal" as the root of all hypocrisy; (2) the detection mechanism of "SLIP"—where hidden properties are smuggled into discourse through uncritical word usage; (3) the "Vertical Shield" (Sub-Test 3g) as the protection of finite beings from burdens only the Infinite can bear; (4) "Radical Radiant" as the diagnosis of anxiety, regret, and burnout as scattered Arrow energy; and (5) the "Craft of Attention" with its "Seasoned Hand" as the model of fluency in living the method. -/- The treatise engages critically with Emmanuel Levinas's ethics of infinite responsibility (demonstrating a Vertical Shield failure) and Karl Popper's falsification criterion (inverting the argument that unfalsifiability is a weakness, showing instead that a Candidate surviving all correct tests is the sign of authenticity). It concludes by proposing "WKWK" as the existential posture of relief at the encounter with the limits of created logic, a breath that actively trusts rather than passively surrenders. -/- The work is offered not as a doctrine to obey, but as a map to be walked and verified against the reader's own sensory data and logic. -/- KEYWORDS: Atomic Distinction, Asymmetric Causality, Falsification Protocol, Vertical Shield, Gate of Assent, Inner Compass, Data Boundary, Ontological Dependence, Radical Radiant, Seasoned Hand, Emmanuel Levinas, Karl Popper, Philosophy of Time, Human Dignity Test, WKWK. (shrink)

Sa papel na ito, tatalakayin natin ang ilang mahahalagang isyu hinggil sa kolektibong imahinasyon at ang ugnayan nito sa realidad at katotohanan. Dapat nating lapatan ang paksang ito sa loob ng isang konseptwal na balangkas, na sinusundan ng isang makatotohanang pagsusuri na tumutugma sa mga napatutunayang realidad sa pag-uugali. Gagamitin natin hindi lamang ang metodolohiya, kundi higit sa lahat ang mga prinsipyo at proposisyon ng analitikal na pilosopiya, na tiyak na magiging maliwanag sa buong pag-aaral at matutukoy sa pamamagitan ng (...) mga sangguniang inilarawan ni Perez [1]. -/- “Iginiit ni Rabossi (1975) na maaaring matukoy ang analitikal na pilosopiya sa pamamagitan ng pagsasaalang-alang sa ilang pamilyar na katangian. Iminumungkahi niya ang mga sumusunod na pamilyar na katangian: isang positibong saloobin tungo sa siyentipikong kaalaman; isang maingat na saloobin tungo sa metapisika; isang konsepsyon ng pilosopiya bilang isang konseptwal na gawain, na kumukuha ng pagsusuri ng nilalaman bilang pamamaraan; isang malapit na ugnayan sa pagitan ng wika at pilosopiya; isang paghahangad na makahanap ng mga argumentatibong sagot sa mga problemang pilosopikal; at isang paghahanap para sa konseptwal na kalinawan.” Ang mga sentral na konseptong ito ay kinapapalooban ng nilalamang kultural, panlipunan, relihiyoso, siyentipiko, pilosopikal, moral, at politikal, na may kinalaman sa indibidwal at kolektibong pag-iral ng bawat isa sa atin. Sa artikulong ito, hindi kami magtatalakay o magpapakita. Hindi layunin naming sistematikong pumuna o patunayan ang anumang bagay sa anumang paraan. Ang gawaing ito ay batay sa analitikal na pagninilay. Maghihinuha lamang kami nang malawakan at malalim hangga't maaari at ipahayag ang mga resulta ng aming mga saloobin. Sa kabila ng multidisiplinaryong kalikasan ng paksa at ng metodolohikal na pagiging bukas na tanggapin ang mga kontribusyon mula sa anumang larangan ng agham, ang gawaing ito ay saklaw ng sikolohiya at ontolohiya o, sa madaling salita, panlipunan at ontolohikal na sikolohiya. Ang malayang metodolohiyang gumagabay sa ganitong mga pagninilay ay sumasaklaw at isinasaalang-alang ang lahat ng bagay na naaayon sa pilosopikal at sikolohikal na epistemolohiya. Hindi layunin ng metodolohiyang ito na maghanap ng ebidensya, kundi simpleng tuklasin ang ugnayan ng mga umiiral na ebidensya—anumang uri at saklaw—upang makabuo ng magkakaugnay na kahulugan para sa mga tunay na bagay. Marami sa mga dakilang isipan, sa anumang panahon, ay hindi kailanman naghanap ng mga patunay, teorya, o sistematisasyon. Ang mga isipang ito ay simpleng nag-iisip, nagmumuni-muni, at sa pamamagitan ng kaliwanagan ng kanilang kababaang-loob ay nagawang mas mapalapit sa katotohanan. Sila ang magiging ating sanggunian at huwarang susundin. Tiyak na hindi natin matatagpuan ang katotohanan, ngunit maaari tayong maging tiyak sa isang bagay: sa maraming sandali, mapapalapit tayo sa katotohanan at, sa lahat ng oras, lalayo tayo sa hindi katotohanan at kabulaanan. Ang pangunahing saklaw ng pag-aaral na ito ay obserbahan kung paano ang ilan sa mga mahahalagang katangiang ebolusyonaryo ng sangkatauhan, tulad ng pagkamalikhain, imahinasyon, at asosasyon, ay maaaring maging isang mapanganib na sakit na naninirahan sa malabong anino ng katalinuhan. (shrink)

We commonly understand objective reality as existing independently of any observer. However, scientists can only access reality through acts of observation, measurement, and conceptual framing. This essay explores the resulting tension. I argue that different forms of inquiry may share a common structural limitation: reality cannot be interrogated independently from the framework through which it is interrogated. If so, the problem of true objectivity may lie beyond our current epistemic horizon. This essay is a step in a broader exploration of (...) the limits of knowability. (shrink)

The twenty-first century is characterized by drastic changes in epistemology, as a result of academical shifts in important fields since the 60s. The decline of metanarratives – defined by Lyotard as grand-narratives about narratives (which, in turn, legitimate historically-situated events) – provided a fertile research ground for new methodological practices based on sharp critiques of Enlightenment rationality. One of the founding authors of the “postmodern condition” (as Lyotard labels it) is Michel Foucault. Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical project regarding epistemology redefined (...) our conceptual approach to knowledge and its legitimation, by situating both concepts in specific historical contexts, at specific historical times. Recurring themes in the Foucauldian project involve skepticism about objective truths, anti-historicism and subjectivity. In this dissertation, I seek to answer the question “Why is Foucauldian methodology relevant in the (post-)modern world, especially in light of the decline of metanarratives?”. The main goal is to address the role of Foucault’s works in the rethinking of historically given narratives and expose the contingency of practices embroiled in power-knowledge relations, while keeping in mind the dispersibility of the origins of those narratives. This is particularly relevant under the framework of an emptying of over-arching narratives about knowledge and the human condition, i.e., the Lyotardian metanarrative. Human societies are usually seen in a context of a larger narrative to which each of our lives in an element. The metanarrative serves as an umbrella for smaller narratives in which other epistemic and moral narratives find their place. There seems to be a clear intersection in Lyotard and Foucault’s works: the former studies the conditions in which the metanarratives empty themselves, while the latter occupies himself with the archaeological/genealogical study of the narratives within the metanarratives that, in turn, occupy the vacuum left by the original metanarrative. There is, nonetheless, a distinction between both authors: while Lyotard sees this replacement as normative-laden, Foucault focuses on a strictly analytical view of discourse and practice. (shrink)

A abordagem foucaultiana à epistemologia rejeita verdades absolutas e enfatiza a construção contingente do saber. Diferente do estruturalismo clássico, que encara fenómenos como subordinados a estruturas fixas, Foucault propôs uma abordagem genealógica para analisar discursos, práticas e relações de poder. O conhecimento não é neutro, mas moldado por mecanismos de poder que influenciam a sua legitimidade. A genealogia foucaultiana, inspirada nas obras de Nietzsche, procura desvendar a forma como diferentes narrativas históricas são construídas e como sustentam verdades socioculturalmente aceites. Nesse (...) sentido, a verdade é um processo dinâmico e discursivo, sujeito a disputas e reconfigurações. O conceito de “dispositivo” foucaultiano destaca a interconexão entre discursos, instituições e práticas sociais. A análise genealógica visa desconstruir narrativas dominantes, promovendo uma visão crítica do conhecimento e da ciência. Consequentemente, o método foucaultiano não procura apenas explicar eventos históricos, mas revelar os processos que os moldaram e as alternativas que poderiam ter sido seguidas. (shrink)

This paper develops an epigenetic theory of the pre semantic threshold, understood as the ecological space in which the shape of the thinkable is modulated before meaning emerges. Rather than treating artificial intelligence as an external tool or a cognitive competitor, the analysis situates it among the environmental pressures acting on the conditions of possibility for sense formation. The pre semantic threshold is described as a modulatory environment that anticipates plausibility, saturates alternatives, and orients what can emerge as relevant. Within (...) this framework, human “excesses” - such as the capacity to inhabit uncertainty, to reframe a problem, or to perceive what is not explicitly stated - are not immutable essences but fragile possibilities dependent on ecological openness. The paper distinguishes distraction, understood as a form of attentional capture, from play, understood as a form of excess that suspends finality and reopens the field of the possible. (shrink)

This article addresses the issue of historical knowledge in relation to material evidence. More specifically, it asks, What objects capture the historian's attention and what knowledge is gained from those objects? What does the historian's gaze select as “things of history” and thus as removed from a world of object assemblages and fluid matter? Is it the case that only artifacts deliberately produced or modified by humans (regardless of the purpose) count as “things of history”? Or do physical entities produced (...) by unintended human and nonhuman factors also display temporal endurance or alteration occurring over time and resonate with humans? Are “things of history” only entities endowed with shape, or do formless materials qualify too? In this article, I outline a theory of intentionality in relation to material items for two main reasons. First, it allows for a “critique of material evidence,” which is still missing in the historical discipline. Second, it enables us to address any remaining epistemological, ethical, or political issues, biases, or contradictions associated with the multifaceted research on material culture that affect the way we do history. (shrink)

This article examines the emergence of a new epistemic value that was attributed to remnants of the past during the broad debate on historical evidence in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the unintentionality of the testimony. Beginning in the early modern period, growing awareness of the partiality of historical literacy narratives regarded as intentional testimonies as well as growing interest in nonwritten pasts have led to the consideration of other kinds of relics, which have been seen as unwitting and (...) indirect carriers of information about the past. Material and iconographic remains, languages and oral traditions, costumes, and superstitious practices gained currency as “neutral” and “authentic” testimonies of times past. This process is accessed by analyzing the historical evidence par excellence in eighteenth-century France: the monument as material and immaterial remains. Over the course of this period, evidence underwent impressive semantic enhancement and became a polysemic epistemological object. At the time, the term “monument” referred to an intentional mark designed for and entrusted to the future and to unwitting or involuntary evidence of the past, evidence that was later invested with historical value not originally intended by its maker. Although the nineteenth century saw the term “monument” lose its meaning as an unwitting trace of the past, what has survived is the epistemic value of an unintentionality of testimonies, albeit under other conceptual guises such as “remnants,” “witnesses in spite of themselves,” “traces,” and “clues.” What, then, is the usefulness of still imagining unintentionality today for the practice of research and for historical understanding? (shrink)

How do limited observers construct functional models of a dynamic reality? This overview integrates a multi-disciplinary research program traversing metaphysics, the philosophy of AI, and informational epistemology. By analysing the "cognitive lenses" and linguistic architectures that shape our focus, the text provides a map of the boundaries where scientific models create friction with reality, framing the edge of knowability not as a failure of inquiry, but as a structural property of cognition itself.

What is the primary intellectual aim of philosophy? The standard view is that philosophy aims to provide true answers to philosophical questions. But if our aim is to settle controversy by answering such questions, our discipline is an embarrassing failure. Moreover, taking philosophy to aim at providing true answers to these questions leads to a variety of puzzles: How do we account for philosophical expertise? How is philosophical progress possible? Why do job search committees not care about the truth or (...) falsity of a candidate’s philosophical views? We argue that philosophy does not aim at discovering true answers to philosophical questions. Instead, its primary intellectual aim is understanding. We argue that many familiar aspects of philosophy become intelligible once we accept this hypothesis. (shrink)

Many philosophers have recently challenged the monistic idea that knowledge is the sole aim of our inquiries into questions. Specifically, by giving examples, they argue that we can factually and legitimately inquire into questions to achieve states different from the mere knowledge of the correct and complete answer. Given this, they end up with a pluralistic stance about the aim of our inquiries into questions. In this paper, I will show that the pluralists’ cases do not seriously threaten knowledge monism. (...) First, I will describe how a knowledge monist can slightly revise her position and motivate the following claim: The aim of our inquiries into questions is not the mere knowledge but the occurrent knowledge of the correct and complete answer – a type of knowledge that is operative in our actions and cognition. Second, I will show how the monist can defend this position from the cases the pluralists offer by highlighting how our inquiries come in a variety and are bound to contextual aspects. Finally, by analysing the monist’s strategy further, I will end up with a new theory of inquiry: A theory that is contextualist, pluralist about the variety of inquiries, but monistic about their specific aims. (shrink)

Faced with vivid cases of inferential knowledge to which false premises seem evidentially indispensable—knowledge-from-falsehood cases, or 'KFF cases'—some of us retreat from the traditional, Aristotelian view that only knowledge begets knowledge in reasoning. But KFF-ers are a minority in the debate over such cases. The epistemology of reasoning is still dominated by KDF-ers, those for whom, on close inspection, purported KFF cases turn out to be knowledge-despite-falsehood cases. Each group has its own warring factions. I belong with those who think (...) that every KDF proposal on the market is hopeless, which saddles me with the fundamental problem for KFF-ers: the task of explaining why some false premises are knowledge-suppressing, or 'malignant', while others are knowledge-yielding, or 'benign'. Some have suggested that a satisfactory KFF view might be found within truth-tracking epistemologies, either a safety-based theory or a sensitivity-based one. I examine the hypothesis and conclude that it fails. I then turn to the defeasibility theory of knowledge, a theory that has been deployed by its chief architect, Peter Klein, in defense of a KDF stance, and argue that the desired benign/malignant distinction can be found within a properly formulated, non-Kleinian defeasibility theory. (shrink)

The question of why anything exists is often treated as either trivial or unanswerable. Yet dismissing it overlooks the possibility that its inaccessibility reflects limits of our epistemic capacity. This essay argues that the question is meaningful, but currently lies beyond our epistemic horizon, constrained by our informational capabilities. This work is a step in a broader exploration of the limits of knowability.

Bu çalışma, varlık ile bilgi arasındaki ilişkinin sistematik ve karşılaştırılabilir biçimde analiz edilmesini sağlayan DuruVizyon Analitik Düzlemi modelini önermektedir. Model, ontolojik ve epistemolojik kipleri iki bağımsız eksen olarak ele alır ve ontolojik imkân, ontolojik gerçeklik, epistemolojik imkân ve epistemolojik gerçeklik ayrımlarını tek bir analitik düzlem üzerinde konumlandırır. Bu çerçevede çalışma, varlık ile bilginin birbirine indirgenemeyen fakat birlikte incelenmesi gereken iki alan olduğunu savunur. Analitik Düzlem, “gerçek”, “mümkün”, “bilinen” ve “bilinmeyen” gibi temel felsefi ayrımların koordinatlı bir yapı içinde analiz edilmesini mümkün (...) kılar. Çalışma ayrıca modelin dört temel bölgesini, bölgeler arası geçişleri ve biçimsel modellemeye açılabilecek kuramsal potansiyelini değerlendirir. (shrink)

Although the ethical and political implications of secrecy are significant, I argue here that its fundamental nature is epistemological and that any account of its nature must be based on its epistemological profile. In particular, I propose examining secrecy within the framework of social and political epistemology, considering secrets as intentional disruptions to the social flow of knowledge. This requires us to postulate a crucial distinction between mysteries and secrets. A mystery is something that is difficult to know, thereby frustrating (...) an individual's epistemic interests. By contrast, a secret is a specific kind of mystery that meets the following three conditions: (1) it is known by someone (the knower); (2) it is unknown to someone else (the unknower); and (3) it is intentionally concealed by someone else (the keeper) in a way that frustrates the unknower's epistemic interests. (shrink)

Digital propaganda is widespread across all social media platforms and in many cases is unintentionally spread. Most people are currently incapable of determining what is factual and what is not on these networks. A number of studies suggest we have entered a period of "truth decay" where facts have been replaced by opinions and subjectivity. Disinformation online is a major contributor to societal polarization and has contributed to a distrust in established organizations like the press, academia, and science. It has (...) been used to great effect by dictators and autocrats who use it to gain supporters and maintain their positions of power. Stopping disinformation will require changes to how social media companies operate, support for legitimate news organizations, and the use of encryption, blockchain and AI technologies. It will also require changes to the educational system which focus on how to evaluate information online. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed in philosophy of religion that omniscience and omnipotence can coherently be attributed to a single agent. Omniscience is typically understood as knowledge of all true propositions, including conditional relations such as causal laws and logical implications. Omnipotence, in turn, is often defined as the ability to bring about or prevent any possible state of affairs. This paper argues that under a strong interpretation of omnipotence, a structural problem arises: the possibility of arbitrary intervention undermines the necessity (...) of conditional relations on which knowledge depends. If one attempts to preserve such relations by appealing to voluntary non-intervention, omnipotence becomes constrained. The argument is formalized through three theorems demonstrating the collapse of conditional necessity. The tension between omniscience and omnipotence thus emerges not from classical paradoxes of power, but from the structure of conditional knowledge itself. (shrink)

In this paper, we offer an account of a paradox analogous to Fitch's paradox of knowability, elaborated around knowledge of necessary truths - such as mathematical or logical truths. In particular, we highlight at which semantic levels the paradox does and does not rise, and explain why that happens. The account employs a novel modal operator and language, which present some distinctive semantic features, such as being unable to characterise many frame properties characterisable in normal modal logic, a fact which (...) may be used in interesting ways to study the logics of the proposed language. Following recent studies, this work may be seen as a case study of semantically insensitive non-normal modal logics. (shrink)

Modern cosmology maintains that the universe is expanding and may ultimately approach a state of heat death. These claims are supported by robust empirical observations, including galactic redshift and large-scale homogeneity. However, this paper argues that such conclusions are not direct descriptions of reality, but model-dependent interpretations of observational data. First, it is shown that all observation is mediated by a modeling framework, which incorporates both theoretical assumptions and cognitive constraints. Second, the paper distinguishes between empirical data (e.g., frequency shifts) (...) and their interpretation (e.g., metric expansion of space), emphasizing that the latter is not uniquely determined by the former. Third, it is argued that key physical concepts such as space, entropy, and equilibrium function as high-level constructs whose stability is limited to certain scales of applicability. From this perspective, cosmological claims—including the expansion of the universe and its thermodynamic fate—should be understood as results of a particular parametrization of observational structure, rather than as ontologically definitive features of reality. The absence of a privileged center and the invariance of observations constrain possible models but do not uniquely fix their interpretation. The paper concludes that statements about the “fate of the universe” reflect the limits of a modeling framework, not the limits of reality itself. (shrink)

The most basic precondition of knowledge is rarely articulated as a question: how is distinction itself possible? Aristotle took this question to its limit when he identified the principle of non-contradiction as the most absolute presupposition of thought (Metaphysics IV.4) — A cannot at once be X and not-X. But the principle itself rests on a prior condition: X and not-X must be Aristotle distinguishable. Without distinguishability, the principle is empty. Distinguishability is therefore prior to thought, and the conditions under (...) which distinguishability can be achieved are the conditions under which knowledge can take any form at all. This paper develops a minimal structural framework addressing that condition, under the constraint that the entity attempting to distinguish is itself part of what it distinguishes. Two assumptions are introduced: (i) information consists in the registration of a difference between two events, and (ii) all observation is performed by subsystems embedded within the system they observe. From these assumptions, together with the existence of minimal temporal and spatial steps t and l, a structural resolution bound r/2 is derived, where r = l/t. Since registering a difference requires at least two events, and each event occupies at least one minimal step, the minimal closure time is 2t and the maximal resolvable rate is r/2. This bound does not depend on measurement precision or specific physical implementations. It follows from the minimal requirements for observational closure under resource constraints, and is therefore structurally distinct from familiar resolution limits in signal processing, which arise from external sampling considerations rather than from the structure of distinguishability itself. Observation is characterised as a coarse-grained process: multiple configurations map to indistinguishable outcomes, and differences that cannot be registered do not enter any internal description. The result is a structural form of epistemic incompleteness — not a deficit of knowledge that better instruments might remove, but a feature of what registration can be when the registering subsystem operates within the system it registers. Possible connections to statistical structure, observation under varying conditions, and the formation of knowledge from accumulated regularities are briefly indicated, without commitment to specific physical interpretations. Where Aristotle established that thought presupposes the principle of non-contradiction, the present framework articulates the prior condition: the structural circumstances under which two events can be registered as distinct, and the bound on what can be so registered when the observer is embedded. form at all. (shrink)

This paper draws a conceptual distinction between the representation of an input and the representation of its cause. It focuses on the latter to systematically examine the epistemic challenges faced by any agent that develops representations of the causes of its inputs—challenges that, by extension, concern any model that implicitly constructs a world model from its input data. We argue that these problems manifest saliently in the case of Large Language Models (LLMs), but that they do not constitute an in-principle (...) limitation of such systems. On the contrary, our main thesis is that current obstacles to reasoning and generalization in LLMs arise, at least in part, not from the absence of human-like multimodal embodiment, but from the structure of human linguistic practices that govern the data on which these models are trained. (shrink)

Can we acquire apriori knowledge of mathematical facts from the outputs of computer programs? People like Burge have argued (correctly in our opinion) that, for example, Appel and Haken acquired apriori knowledge of the Four Color Theorem from their computer program insofar as their program simply automated human forms of mathematical reasoning. However, unlike such programs, we argue that the opacity of modern LLMs and DNNs creates obstacles in obtaining apriori mathematical knowledge from them in similar ways. We claim though (...) that if a proof-checker automating human forms of proof-checking is attached to such machines, then we can obtain apriori mathematical knowledge from them after all, even though the original machines are entirely opaque to us and the proofs they output may not, themselves, be human-surveyable. (shrink)

This paper proposes a unified framework for understanding knowledge, perception, and reality grounded in a single principle: all access to reality is mediated through detectable signals and constructed through processes of signal generation, detection, and interpretation. No observer—biological or artificial—has direct, unmediated access to external truth; instead, all knowledge arises from processes that involve the generation, detection, and interpretation of physical, chemical, or informational traces available in the present. Building on this premise, the paper distinguishes between belief and knowledge, arguing (...) that confirmation is a necessary condition for knowledge, while also recognizing intrinsic limits to what can be verified. It develops a signal-based epistemology in which perception, memory, and scientific inquiry are understood as structured methods of extracting and interpreting signals. Within this framework, memory is not treated as a literal recording of past events, but as a reconstructive process grounded in present neural states, and internal mental phenomena—such as intentions, desires, and emotions—are accessed through signal-mediated processes that involve both interpretation and active generation, rather than direct observation of fully formed internal objects. The analysis further examines constraints imposed by established physics, including limits from thermodynamics, relativity, and quantum mechanics, alongside computational and logical boundaries. These constraints reinforce the central claim that not all truths about reality are epistemically accessible, even if they are ontologically determinate. The paper also distinguishes between simulation and instantiation, arguing that digital systems can represent biological processes but do not constitute biological reality themselves, emphasizing the importance of substrate in discussions of mind, consciousness, and potential “uploading” scenarios. Across domains—including neuroscience, artificial intelligence, physics, and philosophy—the framework highlights a consistent structure: detection depends on signals, and understanding depends on interpretation. This leads to a broader conclusion that the limits of knowledge are not merely technological but are rooted in the fundamental structure of how systems interact with reality. The goal of this work is not to provide a complete theory of mind or physics, but to establish a coherent, cross-domain foundation for understanding the relationship between information, perception, and reality, and to clarify the boundaries within which knowledge can be meaningfully claimed. (shrink)

Ce texte propose une ontologie originale, l’Ontologie des Connaissances (OdC), centrée sur la notion de clôture comme principe fondateur de la signification et de la temporalité. L’auteur illustre cette thèse à travers l’exemple des systèmes de troubleshooting bayésiens (TSIB), où les causes et effets ne sont pas des réalités préexistantes, mais des singularités émergentes produites par une nécessité opérationnelle supérieure (ex. : « Les camions circulent »). -/- L’OdC postule que chaque régime de sens (bulle sémantique) est clos sur lui-même, (...) générant une sémantique et une temporalité propres, incommensurables avec celles des niveaux supérieurs ou inférieurs. Le sujet-connaissant n’est pas un observateur neutre, mais un processus d’En-mesure : une activité constitutive qui engendre à la fois le monde objectivé et sa propre clôture, sans fondement extérieur. -/- Le texte réinterprète le théorème d’incomplétude de Gödel : l’impossibilité pour un système de se saisir entièrement n’est pas un défaut, mais la marque d’une pluralité ontologique radicale. Chaque singularité (sujet, particule, système technique) produit son propre temps et son sens comme effets de sa clôture, sans partage possible avec d’autres régimes. -/- L’objectivation scientifique, loin d’accéder à une réalité absolue, ne capture que l’extension des singularités, laissant leur intension — leur mode d’être propre — hors de portée. Cette ontologie invite à une modestie épistémologique : notre monde n’est qu’une clôture parmi d’autres, et l’altérité (humaine, vivante, matérielle) ne peut être réduite à notre régime de mesure. -/- En conclusion, l’OdC dessine une pluralité de clôtures incommensurables, où chaque singularité est à la fois granule et granulation, sans hiérarchie ni fondement ultime. La pensée doit alors apprendre à habiter cette dispersion, non comme un manque, mais comme la condition même de la rencontre avec l’autre. (shrink)

Using the Hindi-Urdu discourse particle 'lo' as a case study, the present paper models mirativity within the Table model framework (Farkas & Roelofsen, 2017). This comes with an enrichment of the Table model; we propose the discourse structure to encode, in addition to discourse commitments, the time these commitments are publicized. We also incorporate a component that contains the public record of private beliefs. With these two additions, we seek to capture mirativity in the Table model, emphasizing recency as a (...) condition for surprise and underlining the need and the conceptual difficulty of incorporating private beliefs in a public scoreboard of conversation. We show that the difficulty can be overcome to fulfill the modeling need. (shrink)