

DECEMBER 2020

DETAILED REPORT

# December 2020 Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Report

FACEBOOK



We're constantly working to find and stop coordinated campaigns that seek to manipulate public debate across our apps.

## PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT

Over the past three years, we've shared our findings about [coordinated inauthentic behavior](#) we detect and remove from our platforms. As part of our regular CIB reports, we're sharing information about all networks we take down over the course of a month to make it easier for people to see progress we're making in one place.

## WHAT IS CIB?

We view CIB as coordinated efforts to manipulate public debate for a strategic goal where fake accounts are central to the operation. There are two tiers of these activities that we work to stop:

- 1) coordinated inauthentic behavior in the context of domestic, non-government campaigns and
- 2) coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government actor.

## COORDINATED INAUTHENTIC BEHAVIOR (CIB)

When we find domestic, non-government campaigns that include groups of accounts and Pages seeking to mislead people about who they are and what they are doing while relying on fake accounts, we remove both inauthentic and authentic accounts, Pages and Groups directly involved in this activity.

## FOREIGN OR GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE (FGI)

If we find any instances of CIB conducted on behalf of a government entity or by a foreign actor, we apply the broadest enforcement measures including the removal of every on-platform property connected to the operation itself and the people and organizations behind it.

## CONTINUOUS ENFORCEMENT

We monitor for efforts to re-establish a presence on Facebook by networks we previously removed. Using both automated and manual detection, we continuously remove accounts and Pages connected to networks we took down in the past.

## SUMMARY OF DECEMBER 2020 FINDINGS

Our teams continue to focus on finding and removing deceptive campaigns around the world — both foreign and domestic. In December, we removed 17 networks of accounts, Pages and Groups, the most we've removed in any one month. We took down deceptive campaigns from nearly every continent and shared information about our findings with law enforcement, policymakers and industry partners. Here are a few trends and tactics we saw:

**Targeting of domestic audiences:** At least 12 out of 17 networks we investigated and took down last month — in Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Brazil, Argentina, Pakistan, Indonesia and Morocco — targeted domestic audiences in their own countries. At least five networks — from Iran, Ukraine, France, Morocco, and Russia — focused on people outside of their countries. We know these actors will continue to attempt to deceive and mislead people, including making particular viewpoints appear more widely supported or criticized than they are to sway public debate in their respective countries.

**Election targeting and importance of regulations:** At least 12 of 17 influence operations focused on elections, primarily (but not exclusively) on behalf of domestic actors. Deceptive campaigns like these raise a complex challenge by blurring the line between healthy public debate and manipulation. Our teams will continue to find, remove and expose these coordinated manipulation campaigns, but we know these threats extend beyond our platform, and no single organization can tackle them alone. That's why it's critical that we, as a society, have a broader discussion about what is acceptable political advocacy and take steps to deter people from crossing the line. As part of our contribution to this conversation, we outlined recommendations for regulatory and legislative principles against these deceptive campaigns [here](#).

**Early detection and limited reach:** The vast majority of the networks we removed in December had limited following or were in the early stages of building their audiences when we removed them. The small Iranian network is a good example: many of the recent CIB operations from Iran

have continued to become smaller and less effective as we and our peers in the industry find and remove them before they are able to build their audiences, including through improving automated detection systems. To remain active if detected by researchers and platforms, some of the networks we took down last month relied on off-platform websites to host their content while using social media to amplify these domains. Ongoing enforcement against these threat actors across the internet has made these operations less effective in building their following. With each removal, we set back the actors behind these networks, forcing them to re-build their operations and slowing them down.

**Fictitious news entities and targeting of the media:** At least 7 operations we removed last month ran Pages posing as news entities sharing local updates about current events in the countries they targeted. This continued the trend we've seen over the years. Some of the networks in today's report appeared to also target traditional media to place their stories under fictitious bylines. It's critical that all of us, including journalists and influential public figures, remain vigilant about the messages we amplify and verify information we give credence.

**Importance of collaboration with researchers, investigative journalists and local civil society organizations:** We continue to see strong collaboration among companies, researchers, law enforcement and investigative journalists looking for these operations. When one of us finds an operation, we share it with others so we can all investigate and take action according to our policies. At least 10 out of 17 networks in this report were found either in collaboration with our external partners or based on open-source reporting that led our teams to uncover the full extent of coordinated inauthentic behavior on our platforms. We worked with disinformation researchers, investigative journalists and civil society organizations to find and remove these operations. We know that our adversaries will keep evolving their tactics. That's why we continue to invest in building partnerships – to find these campaigns earlier in their operation.

We are making progress rooting out this abuse – but as we've said before, it's an ongoing effort. We're committed to continually improving to stay ahead. That means building better technology, hiring more people and working closely with law enforcement, security experts and other companies.

- **Total number of Facebook accounts removed:** 1,957
- **Total number of Instagram accounts removed:** 707
- **Total number of Pages removed:** 156

- **Total number of Groups removed:** 727

## NETWORKS REMOVED IN DECEMBER 2020:

1. **NEW Iran:** We removed 4 Facebook accounts, part of a small and largely inactive network from Iran. They targeted primarily Arabic, French and English-speaking audiences globally. This network centered around off-platform typo-squatting domains. The vast majority of this activity was detected and disabled by our automated systems for inauthenticity and spam throughout 2020. We found this operation after reviewing information about some of its activity from FireEye and The Daily Beast.
2. **NEW Morocco:** We removed 255 Facebook accounts, 93 Pages, 17 Groups and 60 Instagram accounts that originated in Morocco and targeted Morocco and Algeria. We found links between some of this activity and Qualitia Systems, a marketing firm in Morocco, also known as Marketing Digital Maroc. We found this network as part of our investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region.
3. **NEW Ukraine:** We removed 23 Facebook accounts, 25 Pages, 11 Groups and 19 Instagram accounts that originated in the Luhansk region in Ukraine and targeted Moldova, Kazakhstan, UK, Spain, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Belarus, Germany, and Russia. This network was linked to individuals in the Luhansk region in Ukraine and those associated with Borotba, a political group in Ukraine. It centered around off-platform domains and was early in its audience building when we removed it. We found this activity as a result of reviewing public reporting on a portion of this activity by WELT and netzpolitik.org in Germany.
4. **NEW Ukraine:** We removed 13 Facebook accounts, 31 Pages, six Groups and three Instagram accounts. This domestic-focused network originated in Ukraine and was linked to individuals associated with the non-governmental organization Anti-Corruption Blockpost. The operation had almost no following when we removed it. We found it after reviewing public reporting in Ukraine about some of this activity.
5. **NEW Ukraine:** We removed 27 Facebook accounts, 37 Pages, 21 Groups and 13 Instagram accounts that originated in Ukraine and focused on domestic audiences. Our investigation found links to individuals associated with both the European Solidarity party and Sprava Gromad, an NGO in Ukraine. This network was early in its audience building when we removed it. We found it as part of our investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region.

6. **NEW Kyrgyzstan:** We removed 193 Facebook accounts, 246 Pages, 50 Groups and 30 Instagram accounts that originated in Kyrgyzstan and targeted domestic audiences. This network was linked to individuals in Kyrgyzstan with backgrounds in media consulting and had a limited following when we removed it. We found it after reviewing public reporting in Kyrgyzstan about a small portion of this activity.
7. **NEW Kyrgyzstan:** We removed 92 Facebook accounts, four Pages, 11 Groups and 30 Instagram accounts. This domestic-focused activity originated in Kyrgyzstan and focused primarily on commenting on their content and also on posts by a political party and popular news Pages. This network had almost no following when we removed it. We found it after reviewing public reporting in Kyrgyzstan about a small portion of this activity.
8. **NEW Kyrgyzstan:** We removed 121 Facebook accounts, 46 Pages, seven Groups and 41 Instagram accounts that originated in Kyrgyzstan and targeted domestic audiences. Our investigation found links to individuals in Kyrgyzstan with a background in media and government, and also a media company called Media Center. This activity centered around the 2020 Parliamentary election and the 2021 snap presidential election while playing on multiple sides of the political debate at once. This network had almost no following when we removed it. We found it after reviewing public reporting about a small portion of this activity.
9. **NEW Kazakhstan:** We removed 31 Facebook accounts, one Group and 28 Instagram accounts that originated in Kazakhstan and targeted domestic audiences. Our investigation found links to individuals associated with the National Security Committee and the Anti-Extremism Unit of the Police Department of the North-Kazakhstan Region. This network appeared to have ramped up in 2019-2020 following protests in Kazakhstan and had nearly no following when we removed it. We found it after reviewing public reporting in Kazakhstan about a portion of this activity.
10. **NEW Argentina:** We removed 663 Facebook accounts and 388 Instagram accounts that originated in Argentina and focused on domestic audiences. This network focused primarily on inauthentically amplifying posts and news articles related to Sergio Berni, Buenos Aires' Minister of Security and had almost no following when we removed it. We found it after reviewing public information about a small portion of this activity shared by an open-source [researcher](#). Our assessment benefited from additional findings shared with us by FireEye, a cybersecurity company.

11. **NEW Brazil:** We removed 25 Facebook accounts, three Pages, and 10 Instagram accounts that originated in Paraná and targeted two municipalities in Paraná (Almirante Tamandaré and Colombo) focusing on the 2020 regional elections. Our investigation found links to Continental, a PR Agency based in Curitiba, and other individuals in the state of Paraná in Brazil. This network had almost no following when we removed it. We found this activity as part of our investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region.
12. **NEW Brazil:** We removed 34 Facebook accounts and 18 Instagram accounts that originated in Brazil and focused on three municipalities in the state of Espírito Santo (Serra, Vitória and Cariacica) to amplify the Pages and posts related to mayoral candidates in each town. Our investigation found links to AP Exata Intelligence in Digital Communications, a public relations firm with offices in Brasília, Vitória and Braga in Portugal. This network had nearly no following when we removed it. We found it as part of our investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region.
13. **NEW Pakistan:** We removed 27 Facebook accounts, seven Pages, and 23 Instagram accounts that originated in Pakistan and targeted domestic audiences. This network created Pages posing as news entities and was early in building its audience when we removed it. We found it as a result of our investigation into the suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior with some limited links to the network we [removed](#) in August 2019.
14. **NEW Indonesia:** We removed 107 Facebook accounts, 58 Pages, and 34 Instagram accounts that originated in Indonesia and targeted domestic audiences. This network focused primarily on the situation in West Papua and had limited following when we removed it. We found this activity as part of our investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region.
15. **France:** We removed 84 Facebook accounts, 6 Pages, 9 Groups, and 14 Instagram accounts that originated in France and targeted primarily the Central African Republic and Mali, and to a lesser extent Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Cote d'Ivoire and Chad. Our investigation found links to individuals associated with the French military. This network had nearly no following when we removed it. We found this activity as part of our investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region. **(Originally [announced](#) on December 15, 2020)**
16. **Russia:** We removed 61 Facebook accounts, 29 Pages, 7 Groups and 1 Instagram account that originated in Russia. They targeted primarily the Central African Republic (CAR), and to a lesser extent Madagascar, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique,

South Africa, and the CAR diaspora in France. We found links to individuals associated with past activity by the Internet Research Agency (IRA) and previous operations we attributed to entities associated with Russian financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin, who was [indicted](#) by the US Justice Department. This network was early in its audience building when we removed it. We found this activity as a result of our investigation into the suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior with links to the network we [removed](#) in October 2019. Our assessment benefited from information shared with us by researchers at Graphika. **(Originally [announced](#) on December 15, 2020)**

17. **Russia:** We removed 197 Facebook accounts, 122 Page, 16 Group and 15 Instagram accounts that originated in Russia and focused primarily on Libya, Sudan, and Syria. We found links to individuals associated with past activity by the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA). We found this activity as a result of our proactive internal investigation into the suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region — with some limited links to the networks we [removed](#) in October 2019. **(Originally [announced](#) on December 15, 2020)**



# 01

**We removed 4 Facebook accounts for violating our policy against [foreign interference](#) which is [coordinated inauthentic behavior](#) on behalf of a foreign entity. This small network — which was largely inactive when we removed it and centered around off-platform domains — originated in Iran. It targeted primarily Arabic, French and English-speaking audiences globally.**

The people behind this activity used fake accounts to post links to typo-squatting domains (where web URLs mimic legitimate websites' names with slight typos to trick people into clicking on them). Some of these accounts were used to create fictitious personas posing as journalists, impersonate people, reach out to news outlets and post links to these domains in comments to public figures' posts. This network also appeared to have posted forged documents, including the letter allegedly authored by Senator Duckworth about the fire on the USS Bonhomme Richard. They posted about US-Israel relations, fictitious claims about family members of politicians in Israel and the UAE contributions to the US election campaign, and news related to the coronavirus pandemic. Most of this activity was detected and disabled by our automated systems for inauthenticity and spam throughout 2020.

We found these accounts after reviewing information about some of this activity shared by FireEye and The Daily Beast. Although the people behind it attempted to conceal their identities, our investigation found links to individuals in Iran.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 4 Facebook accounts.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these accounts.

RT Arabic shared a video. \*\*\*  
Russia state-controlled media · September 18, 2019  
حذاء بملابس سوداء ودقيقة صممت حزنا على موت باندا في تايلندا  
[See Translation](#)



عزاء باندا

أمريكا تلتصق السعودية للإستفادة بمخالفات والنشطاء في المنطقة ردا على هجوم الطائرات المسيورة على المنشآت النفطية السعودية كشفت شارين هاسكيل عبر صفحتها الرسمية على تويتر بعد طلب رسمي من جانب الحكومة السعودية أنه لم يرسل وفد من الخبراء الإسرائيليين إلى المملكة العربية السعودية لتدعري الأمر. ورواها لما قلته السيدة شارين هاسكيل أن أد بن سلمان نائب وزير الدفاع السعودي طلب عبر سفير الأردن في إسرائيل. بشأن المجاني من الجنرال أليكساند توركين قلته القوات الجوية الإسرائيلية أن توعت إسرائيل. وفدا من الخبراء إلى المملكة لدراسة هجوم الميغرات الحولية على المنشآت النفطية السعودية. ورواها على ما صرحت به شارين هاسكيل فده بعثت إسرائيل وفدا مكون من 15 خبيرا من وراء هتسة الطيران والقضاء الجوي برئاسة جوزف وبين رئيس هذه المنظمة إلى المناطق الشرقية في المملكة العربية السعودية. <https://twitter.com/SharrenHaskel/status/1173910256843460609>  
<https://www.jta.org/1969/09/11/archive/israel-grants-aramco-permission-to-resume-pumping-of-oil-through-golan-heights>  
[Translate](#)

### Translation:

Caption: “Mourning in black clothes and a minute of silence for the death of a panda in Thailand”

Comment: America advises Saudi Arabia to enlist the help of U.S. allies in the region in response to drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities, Shareen Haskel revealed on her official Twitter account, after an official request from the Saudi government that a delegation of Israeli experts had been to Saudi Arabia to investigate the matter.


 ► We love our IDF soldiers <3  
Oct 5, 2020 4:49am

Breaking News!!! Israel is in a great danger! Hezbollah underwater SPY drone was identified on the coast of Haifa  
<https://twitter.com/IsraelHayomEng/status/1313032538638749696?s=19>



## Translation:

Text in French: Black soldiers USS  
Bonhomme Richard



# 02

**We removed 255 Facebook accounts, 93 Pages, 17 Groups and 60 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against [foreign interference](#) which is [coordinated inauthentic behavior](#) on behalf of a foreign entity. This network originated in Morocco and targeted Morocco and Algeria.**

We found several clusters of activity that relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to comment, drive people to off-platform domains, and manage Pages. This network’s accounts amplified content from its Pages to make it appear more popular than it was. Some of these fake accounts went through significant name changes, including switching between male and female names. At least one Page posed as a regional Page for Huffington Post.

This network posted in Arabic and French about news and current events in the region, including political issues in Morocco and Algeria; supportive commentary about the king of Morocco and its security services, protests in Algeria, Morocco’s progress in fighting the pandemic, and vaccine development. They also criticized independent journalists, Amnesty International and its reporting on human rights abuses in Morocco, protests in Morocco, the Justice and Development Party, the government of Algeria, the Polisario Front and its claims that Western Sahara isn’t part of Morocco.

We found this network as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region. Although the people behind this activity attempted to conceal their identities and coordination, our investigation found links between at least one cluster in this network and Qualitia Systems, a marketing firm in Morocco, also known as Marketing Digital Maroc.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 255 Facebook accounts, 93 Pages, 17 Groups and 60 accounts on Instagram.

- *Followers:* About 1.7 million accounts followed one or more of these Pages, about 11,000 accounts joined at least one of these Groups and around 4,200 people followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.
- *Advertising:* About \$19,000 in spending for ads on Facebook and Instagram paid for in US dollars.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these Pages:



#### Translation:

The separatist Polisario Front gets its youth in the Tindouf camps ready for the terrorists in the Sahel region



### Translation:

Page name: Lovers of King Mohammed VI  
and the Royal Family

Caption: Good morning, lovers of our beloved  
king. Our beloved king is at the height of  
elegance.

#Thank\_You\_Your\_Highness\_the\_King



### Translation:

Comment: Message from a Tunisian who dreams of a united North Africa: We hold the Algerian system responsible, because it is the source of hostility in the region. Brother people of Algeria, only your Hirak [protest movement] can save us



### Translation:

Caption: The United Arab Emirates forbids Algerian citizens from entering its territory because over the past years many terrorists and extremists have come from Algeria, and the government is unable to control the terrorist groups in the depths of the Algerian desert. Source below



# 03

**We removed 23 Facebook accounts, 25 Pages, 11 Groups and 19 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against [foreign interference](#) which is [coordinated inauthentic behavior](#) on behalf of a foreign entity. This network originated in the Luhansk region in Ukraine and targeted Moldova, Kazakhstan, UK, Spain, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Belarus, Germany, and Russia.**

The people behind this deceptive campaign used fake accounts to manage Pages and Groups, drive people to off-platform domains masquerading as independent news entities in countries they targeted, and comment to make their posts seem more popular than they were. Each Page had an accompanying domain and posted content hosted on these websites. It appears that the network accelerated its activity in 2020 and some of its content was re-printed by media organizations in Germany and Russia, including Sputnik Germany. These accounts used stock images as their profile photos. They posted primarily in English, German and Russian – about news and current events in countries they targeted, including politics in Moldova; Russia’s victory in World War II; fictitious claims about the Salisbury poisoning in the UK; positive commentary about USSR and pro-Russia politicians in Moldova; criticism of pro-EU politicians in Moldova, and the US election results.


We found this network as a result of reviewing public reporting on some of this activity by Die WELT and netzpolitik.org in Germany. Although the people behind this activity attempted to conceal their identities, our investigation found links to individuals in the Luhansk region in Ukraine and those associated with Borotba, a political group in Ukraine.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 23 Facebook accounts, 25 Pages, 11 Groups and 19 accounts on Instagram.
- *Followers:* About 23,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, around 7,000 joined one or more of these Groups, and around 17,600 people followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.



- *Advertising:* About \$4,000 in spending for ads on Facebook and Instagram paid for primarily in US dollars and rubles.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these Pages.




**Translation:**

Page name: Initiative "May 9"

Caption: Happy Victory Over Fascism Day!

The movement "Initiative "May 9" congratulates everyone on the 75th anniversary of the great victory of the Soviet people and all anti-fascists over Nazi Germany!


Image overlay: Happy Victory day!



### Translation:

Page name: Echo of Kyrgyzstan

Caption: People's distrust of authorities slows down the development of the Kyrgyz economy



### Translation:

Page name: Truth-teller

Article title: Dumitru Alayba was caught spreading fakes

# 04


**We removed 13 Facebook accounts, 31 Pages, six Groups, and three Instagram accounts for violating our policy against [coordinated inauthentic behavior](#). This domestic-focused activity originated in Ukraine.**

The people behind this network used fake accounts to post and comment on their own content to make it appear more popular than it was, manage Groups and Pages, some of which posed as news entities. Some of this network's accounts and Pages had already been detected and disabled for spam and inauthenticity. Some of their content appeared on legitimate news sites in Ukraine under fictitious bylines. The people behind this operation posted primarily in Ukrainian and also in Russian about economic and political news, corruption in Ukraine, supportive commentary about some politicians like the former head of the State Tax Service in Ukraine, governor of the Odessa region, one of the local politicians in Odessa, and the UA Railway. They also posted content critical of some politicians, including Aleksandr Dubinskiy, Evgeniy Plinskiy, Luydmila Demchechenko, Igor Umanskiy, and Sergey Marchenko.

We found this campaign after reviewing public reporting in Ukraine about some of this activity. The vast majority of this network was inactive at the time we removed it. Although the people behind it attempted to conceal their identities, our investigation found links to individuals associated with the non-governmental organization Anti-Corruption Blockpost.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 13 Facebook accounts, 31 Pages, 6 Groups, and 3 accounts on Instagram.
- *Followers:* About 31,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, about 7,000 accounts joined at least one of these Groups and around 250 people followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.
- *Advertising:* Less than \$9,500 in spending for ads on Facebook and Instagram paid for in US dollars.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these Pages.



#### Translation:

Page name: Taxpayers

Caption: **!** IMF memorandum and tranche - what to expect from taxpayers **!**

- The simplified taxation system for sole proprietors will not be abolished.
- No new tax benefits and privileges will be introduced.
- Adoption of a law on tax amnesty.



#### Translation:

Page name: Anti-corruption checkpoint

Caption: "Mom loves speed" - Dubinsky  blocked consideration of anti-corruption laws in the Verkhovna Rada for a week!!

On Monday, all parliamentary factions-groups reached a common ground on the bill № 4304 (On the restoration of certain provisions of the Law of Ukraine "On Prevention of Corruption" and the Criminal Code). However, this morning he submitted an alternative bill


According to the procedures, the Verkhovna Rada will start consideration of new anti-corruption laws only next plenary week



## Translation:

Page name: Institute of Infrastructure Monitoring

Caption: In recent years, Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian Railway - UR) has been purchasing electricity through its "gasket" through which UR officials launder the state-owned company's funds. UR "dealers" benefit, and the company incurs losses. More details:



## Translation:

Page name: Black customs officer

Caption: The authorities did not think for a long time where to get money from to cover a huge hole in the budget, like the Grand Canyon and even more, for which Marchenko and his henchmen are personally responsible. The answer was found quickly - in the homeland of the President in the person of Lakshmi Mitall, the owner of Krivorozhstal. And what if the IMF does not give money either before the New Year, or even after. It's time to start surplus appropriation - this is the recipe ❤️



# 05


**We removed 27 Facebook accounts, 37 Pages, 21 Groups and 13 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behavior. This domestic-focused activity originated in Ukraine.**

The people behind this activity used fake accounts to create fictitious personas, evade our enforcement, manage Pages, and post in Groups named after cities in Ukraine. They also shared content from official Pages of political parties and politicians and liked and commented on other people's posts to make them appear more popular than they were. This network posted in Ukrainian and Russian about news and politics in Ukraine, including supportive commentary about European Solidarity and its candidates, NGO Sprava Gromad, former President Poroshenko and criticism of President Zelensky. Some of this content was rated false by local fact-checkers.

We found this activity as a result of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region. Although the people behind this network attempted to conceal their identities, our investigation found links to individuals associated with both the European Solidarity party and Sprava Gromad, an NGO in Ukraine.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 27 accounts, 37 Pages, 21 Groups and 13 accounts on Instagram.
- *Followers:* About 77,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, about 16,500 accounts joined at least one of these Groups and around 7,400 people followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.
- *Advertising:* Around \$300 in spending for ads on Facebook and Instagram paid for in US dollars and also in rubles.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these Pages.



### Translation:

Page name: Wonders believe in Alice


Caption: We are offering to Ministry of Education a riddle for the school workbooks "I explore the world" for the 2nd grade instead of Monatik and Doroyeeva

First image: 1. I got off the plane that I promised to sell

2. Got into the cortege that I promised to get rid off

3. I went to the dacha that I promised to give to children


Second image: Maybe enough already?



## Translation:

Comment: This is what I understand! Humor and sense of responsibility! And the best thing is that one can always approach you and ask and you'll never say no!






### Translation:

Page name: Rebel Puppets

Caption: European parliament says that the visa-free regime is threatened! After last month Ukrainian parliament passed the law that destroys the principles of independence of the anti-corruption prosecutor's office!



## Translation:

Comment: One can conclude that Lvyy is growling at Kyiv and we cannot defend ourselves

# 06

**We removed 193 Facebook accounts, 246 Pages, 50 Groups and 30 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behavior. This domestic-focused activity originated in Kyrgyzstan.**

The people behind this activity used fake accounts — many of which had already been detected and disabled by our automated systems — to comment, post in Groups and manage Pages. They also openly offered social media management services. This network was primarily active around the 2017 presidential election in Kyrgyzstan. It posted primarily in Kyrgyz and also in Russian and focused on promoting the former President Jeenbekov's 2017 electoral campaign, while also criticizing his opponents.

We found this network after reviewing public reporting in Kyrgyzstan about a small portion of this activity. Although the people behind this activity attempted to conceal their identities, our investigation found links to individuals in Kyrgyzstan with backgrounds in media consulting.


- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 193 Facebook accounts, 246 Pages, 50 Groups and 30 accounts on Instagram.
- *Followers:* About 85,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, about 39,000 accounts joined at least one of these Groups and around 27,000 people followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.
- *Advertising:* Less than \$4,800 in spending for ads on Facebook and Instagram paid for primarily in US dollars.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these Pages.



**Translation:**


Butun Kyrgyzstan [United Kyrgyzstan] - Party of old farts



**Translation:**

Page name: Kyrgyz Politics

Caption: Jeenbekov and Babanov started arguing. Jeenbekov pushed Babanov to the brink



### Translation:

Caption: People choose the person they deserve and that can work! I know that Omurbek Babanov was chosen by those who made the right choice!

Comment: emoji



### Translation:

Caption: LET'S SUPPORT DUISHENBEK ZILALIEV! WE ARE FOR JUST COURT!

#ЗАЗИЛАЛИЕВА

#ЗИЛАЛИЕВГЕБОШТОНДУК

Comment: They put an absolutely innocent person in jail! It's a political act! I hope the trial will be as transparent and honest as possible!

# 07


**We removed 92 Facebook accounts, four Pages, 11 Groups and 30 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behavior. This domestic-focused activity originated in Kyrgyzstan.**

This network used fake accounts — some of which had already been detected and disabled by our automated systems — to post in Groups, manage Pages, and like content to make it appear more popular than it was. The majority of this activity centered around commenting on their own content and posts by Mekenim Kyrgyzstan party’s Page and popular news Pages in Kyrgyzstan like Kloop, Azattyk, Kaktus, and AKIpress. These comments focused on either condemning negative stories about the politician Matraimov’s family and the Mekenim Kyrgyzstan party or agreeing with critical stories about the party’s opponents. They also posted in Russian and Kyrgyz about domestic news and current events including elections that took place between 2017 and 2020. One cluster within this network posted primarily in support of the Mekenim Kyrgyzstan party and criticized its political opponents. The other cluster posted about political news in Kyrgyzstan including the scandal related to the local internet service provider Aknet, elections in 2020 and 2021, various claims of corruption, positive commentary about the Matraimov family, and criticism of former President Atambaev.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 92 Facebook accounts, 4 Pages, 11 Group and 30 accounts on Instagram.
- *Followers:* About 1,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, about 1,900 accounts joined one or more of these Groups and around 20,700 people followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.
- *Advertising:* Around \$4,500 in spending for ads on Facebook and Instagram paid for in US dollars.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these Pages.





### Translation:

Caption: "Almazbek Atambaev offered the investigators to answer the queries around Batykaev's case in writing without making it public, but the offer was rejected.

Comment: He should be put in jail! Sick of him!



### Translation:

How Ali Toktakunov pulled our leg (hung noodles on our ears), speaking only about Matraimov, he did not mention Ikram Ilmijanov at all, who actually ran the entire customs service.




#### Translation:

Caption: "Not even surprised 🤔🤔🤔"

I don't want to study, I wanna be a deputy"

Shared post: R. Mombekov graduated from the Law Faculty of the Kyrgyz State University in 2003, then with this diploma he received a second higher degree in International Relations at the Diplomatic Academy! R. Mombekov's legal diploma is fake, but this did not stop him from working in various leadership positions after 2010, and becoming a deputy! This is how people without education become MPs and decide on important issues.



#### Translation:

Caption: I also want a million, I also want to have an overseas bank account..

Comment: Well, the music is excellent) it should have been devoted to ATAMBAYEV

# 08

**We removed 121 Facebook accounts, 46 Pages, seven Groups and 41 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behavior. This domestic-focused network originated in Kyrgyzstan.**

The people behind this activity used fake accounts — some of which had already been detected and disabled by our automated systems — to drive people to off-platform domains, manage Pages posing as news entities, post in Groups and comment on other people’s content. Some of the Pages claimed to be supporting particular politicians while other Pages posed as critical of the same political figures. This activity primarily centered around the 2020 Parliamentary election and the 2021 snap presidential election, while playing on multiple sides of the political debate at once. This network posted primarily in Kyrgyz and also in Russian about political news and current events in Kyrgyzstan including the October 2020 election, supportive commentary about former Presidents Japarov and Atambayev, and also criticism of both of these politicians.

We found this network after reviewing public reporting about a small portion of this activity. Although the people behind it attempted to conceal their identities, our investigation found links to individuals in Kyrgyzstan with a background in media and government, and also a media company called Media Center.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 121 Facebook accounts, 46 Pages, 7 Groups and 41 Instagram accounts.
- *Followers:* Around 31,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, about 11,000 accounts joined one or more of these Groups and around 8,800 people followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.
- *Advertising:* Around \$1,250 in spending for ads on Facebook and Instagram paid for in US dollars.


Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these Pages and accounts:



## Translation:

Caption summary: Babanov and Kazakbaev are conspiring against government and behind the groups in social media that are "broadcasting audio, video, and false information against the government"


Comment: Babanov should go to jail!



### Translation:


Caption on the original post: People's choice  
Sadyr Japarov

Video overlay: Sadyr President. Serving the  
future!



### Translation:

Caption: Is Temirlan Sultanbekov registered at  
a famous psychiatric hospital in Moscow?



### Translation:

Caption: How did Mombekov become a  
millionaire?

Video Text overlay: How did Mombekov  
become a millionaire?

Comment: Mombekov's diploma is fake!

# 09

**We also removed 31 Facebook accounts, one Group and 28 Instagram accounts for coordinated inauthentic behavior. This domestic-focused network originated in Kazakhstan.**


We found several distinct clusters of activity within this network. They used fake accounts to impersonate others and leave critical comments on posts by local news organizations, activists and opposition in Kazakhstan. Many of these accounts were created at once and used photos of historical figures like Vincent Van Gogh and Marco Polo or photos of notable landmarks like Eiffel Tower as their profile images. Some accounts impersonated an activist and a blogger in Kazakhstan. This network appeared to have ramped up in 2019-2020 following protests in Kazakhstan. It posted in Russian and Kazakh about domestic news and current events including criticism of Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, a banned opposition group in Kazakhstan; allegations towards activists of being criminals and scammers; and supportive commentary about the police and the People's Party of Kazakhstan.

We found this activity after reviewing public reporting in Kazakhstan about a portion of this activity. Although the people behind this network attempted to conceal their identity and coordination, our investigation found links to individuals associated with the National Security Committee and the Anti-Extremism Unit of the Police Department of the North-Kazakhstan Region.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 31 Facebook accounts, 1 Group and 28 Instagram accounts.
- *Followers:* 1 account joined this Group and about 1,250 people followed one of more of these Instagram accounts.



Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these Pages and accounts:



#### Translation:

Image overlay: #youcanrunfromthetruth

I'm a fraudster

I've come up with a fictional diagnosis for my daughter - in order to create hype and make money



#### Translation:

Caption: NEW HEAD APPOINTED TO DISTRICT POLICE DEPARTMENT IN NORTH-KAZAKHSTAN OBLAST

Comment: We congratulate you on your appointment! Only forward

Comment: One of the best bosses in the department!

Comment: Worthy and deserved appointment! Literate, communicative and educated leader! Success in your new role!



### Translation:

Image overlay: Democracy | Getting paid for an opposition spectacle



### Translation:

#pedophile #covid19 #deceased Even the lawyer [redacted], who most likely realized that it makes no sense to pull out all the stops for this criminal, did not help this fraudster and pedophile, as she sensibly comprehends and understands who he really is...



# 10

**We removed 663 Facebook accounts and 388 Instagram accounts for coordinated inauthentic behavior. This network originated in Argentina and focused on domestic audiences.**

The people behind this activity used fake accounts — some of which had already been detected and removed by our automated systems — to create elaborate fictitious personas using profile photos generated by artificial intelligence, post, like and comment on content to make it appear more popular than it was. This network posted in Spanish and focused primarily on inauthentically amplifying posts and news articles related to Sergio Berni, Buenos Aires' Minister of Security. These accounts liked and re-shared the same posts at once from this politician's official Page. They also posted about hobbies, animals, and cooking to appear more authentic.

We found this network after reviewing public information about a small portion of this activity shared by an open source researcher. Our assessment benefited from additional findings shared with us by FireEye, a cybersecurity company.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 663 Facebook accounts and 388 Instagram accounts.
- *Followers:* About 10,000 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these Pages and accounts:



#### Translation:

Caption: 'That's my boss, always ahead. #thepoliticalchinstrapofkicillof'.



#### Translation:

Image overlay: Ensenada - School Food System.

Caption: # Weekly Summary | Learn about the work that we carry out in the Province during this week. #BonaerenseSummary.



### Translation:

'Sharing what happened in the #Zárate monitoring center when I went to look for information about a criminal act'.



### Translation:

"Interview with Sergio Berni on Radio Mitre. Listen and download Sergio Berni interview episodes for free".

# 11

**We removed 25 Facebook accounts, three Pages, and 10 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behavior. This domestic-focused network originated in the state of Paraná in Brazil.**

We found two clusters of activity that used fake accounts — some of which had already been detected and disabled by our automated systems — to post, comment and manage Pages. One of these Pages posed as an independent news entity. This activity targeted two municipalities in the state of Paraná — Almirante Tamandaré and Colombo — and focused on the 2020 regional elections. The majority of likes and comments on this network’s Pages were by their own accounts. The people behind this campaign posted in Portuguese about the mayoral elections. They also shared supportive commentary about the current mayor of Almirante Tamandaré and the mayoral candidate associated with the PSD party in Colombo, as well as criticism of these candidates’ political opponents.

We found this activity as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region. Although the people behind it attempted to conceal their identities and coordination, our investigation found links to Continental, a PR Agency based in Curitiba, and other individuals in the state of Paraná.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 25 Facebook accounts, 3 Pages, and 10 Instagram accounts.
- *Followers:* Around 1,600 accounts followed one or more of these Pages and around 2,300 people followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.
- *Advertising:* Around \$160 in spending for ads on Facebook and Instagram paid for in Brazilian reais.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these Pages and accounts:



#### Translation:

Caption: We came out in the media in 1st place 🏆 Enough of old lies, the time has come for #ChangeColombo55



#### Translation:

Caption: Come and participate in the motorcade for the victory of the candidate number 15! Don't miss it and join us in this great party in defense of Almirante Tamandaré. #Scheduleit # Stay15 # AlmiranteTamandaréMovingForward



### Translation:

Caption: Interview by the 'Tamandaré News' media outlet with the pre-mayoral candidate Gerson Colodel.



### Translation:

Image overlay: Helder confirms 1st place!  
Registered survey in the Superior Electoral Court

Caption: Registered research in the Superior Electoral Court confirms: Helder 55 leads in Colombo. It came out in the press 🖱️ Check the link: [Link]



# 12

**We removed 34 Facebook accounts and 18 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behavior. This domestic-focused network originated in Brazil.**

This network used fake accounts — some of which had already been detected and disabled by our automated systems — to pose as locals in the state of Espírito Santo, like and comment on content related to candidates in the local 2020 elections to make it look more popular than it was. This activity focused on three municipalities in the state of Espírito Santo — Serra, Vitória and Cariacica — and amplified the Pages and posts related to mayoral candidates in each town. In particular, the people behind this campaign re-shared and commented in Portuguese on posts about a candidate from the Democratic Labour Party in Serra, a candidate from Cidadania party in Vitória and another candidate from DEM party in Cariacica.

We found this activity as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region. Although the people behind this network attempted to conceal their identities, our investigation found links to AP Exata Intelligence in Digital Communications, a public relations firm with offices in Brasília, Vitória and Braga in Portugal.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 34 Facebook accounts and 18 accounts on Instagram.
- *Followers:* Around 2,400 people followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.
- *Advertising:* Around \$11,500 in spending for ads on Facebook and Instagram paid for in Brazilian reais.



Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these Pages and accounts:



#### Translation:

Image overlay: Teach entrepreneurship to the students of the municipal public schools. The safe way to Serra. Mayor Sergio Vidigal 12.

Caption: The post-pandemic future increases our responsibility to create opportunities for young people. By teaching entrepreneurship in municipal schools, we open a new world for our students. And we show them that the difficulties exist, but they can be platforms in our jump towards the future.



#### Translation:

Image overlay: Cariacica is 25 on the second round of the elections!

Caption: The hope for better days for Cariacica will become a reality. It is 25.



## Translation:

Image overlay: Talk with Gandini. 26 October, 19:10h. TV Vitória journal. Gandini 23.

Caption: Keep an eye on TV Vitória. Follow today, from 7:10 pm, my live interview with journalists Andressa Missio and Luana Damasceno. The interview will then be available on the website of the Folha Vitória newspaper.



## Translation:

Image overlay: Ibope research confirms Sergio Vidigal on the 1st place. The safe way for Serra. Sergio Vidigal 12.

Caption: Thank you, Serra, for the leadership in the Ibope research. We still have a long way to go to the election, and I count on the support of all of you. We will make this 46% grow even more.

# 13

**We removed 27 Facebook accounts, seven Pages, and 23 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behavior. This domestic-focused network originated in Pakistan.**

We found two clusters of activity that used fake accounts to pose as individuals based in the UAE, post content at spam-like rates across various Groups and manage Pages posing as news entities. Some of these accounts went through significant name changes. The people behind this campaign posted in English and Urdu about regional news and current events, including supportive commentary about the Pakistani government and army, United Arab Emirates and its help to Pakistan in building infrastructure, and UAE's assistance to COVID-affected areas in the Middle East and Africa. They also criticized the UAE regional rivals and the former Prime Minister of Pakistan.

We found this activity as a result of our investigation into the suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region with some limited links to the network we removed in August 2019.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 27 Facebook accounts, 7 Pages, and 23 Instagram accounts.
- *Followers:* Around 12,500 accounts followed one or more of these Pages and around 20,000 people followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these Pages and accounts:



## Translation:

Caption: He said that the United Arab Emirates is the top of the world's overall COVID-19 tests compared to the population. The United Arab Emirates is addressed with COVID-19 disease regarding the population from July to August 2020 The number of tests conducted to be ranked first in the world. Alhamdadi insisted that it is a positive indication that the efforts of frontline workers in various sectors to tackle the epidemic in the UAE and the efforts of the epidemic. Reflects a strong performance. He briefed that the average number of daily tests done in the month of July was 47,857-which is equivalent to daily tests of every 100,000 people - the highest in the world. Furthermore, laboratory examinations were held near July 1,483,576 at the state level to ensure the safety of the community. However, the laboratory exams in August had a 36 percent increase with 2,018,274 July and August The number of average patients has continuously decreased. He further disclosed that the UAE is number 19 in the world in the United Nations with the Covid-19 statistics collected by authorities. According to the number of tests, the least positive cases have been registered compared to the number of tests. Alhamdadi said that this positive number talks about increasing awareness of epidemic in society and the commitment of members to control the spread of the virus. He emphasized that at the current stage now. Safety measures need to be taken as much as possible to preserve the success, noting that the cooperation and cooperation of all classes, citizens and residents of the society is very important to raise awareness. #UAE #Tops #Indicator #Briefing



Middle East Series  
Oct 3, 2020 7:03pm · 🌐

The World Health Organization's 🌐 office in #Turkey 🇹🇷 has reiterated its call for reporting #COVID19 data in line with #WHO guidances to "harmonize data collection and response measures." WHO's statement comes days after Turkey's health minister revealed that the daily COVID-19 📊 figures published by the ministry since July 29 reflected only patients with symptoms, excluding asymptomatic #positive\_cases. 📉 #Critics have questioned the veracity of the case and death toll numbers #Turkey has reported during the #pandemic. The WHO statement commended Turkey on its increased testing capacity and contact tracing efforts. It said, "#Turkey has been isolating all COVID-19 📊 #positive cases, regardless of their #symptoms." It added that the #WHO has been consulting with members, including #Turkey 🇹🇷 to improve reporting and data collection. #MES #MiddleEastSeries 🌐

Translate



MES @MiddleEastSeries WHO calls on Turkey to follow its COVID-19 reporting guides Middle East Series

Sep 26, 2020 9:17pm · 🌐

UAE khalifa foundation helps needed people in Balochistan, Thia is great initiative ♥️ 🌟 We proud on our friendship relationship with UAE. Thanks for support #KhalifaFoundation #UAE #pakistan

Translate

Album containing 6 item(s)





## Translation:

Caption: Human Rights Watch says Qatar has failed to provide rights to foreigners for a long time, nor is there any institution that listens to their voice, if a foreign woman works in an institution, she is backed up. It goes while Qatari employees are given more priority It's clear that foreigners in Qatar have no priority nor any rights, even if they want to come back, they are not able to come out of contract and money, nor are they being paid salaries. Are, This should not happen at all, be it country or foreign, everyone gets the same rights. #qatar #migrantsrights #LabourRights #womenrights #MigrantLabourers #HumanRightsViolations #migrantworkers #HumanRightsWatch

# 14

**We removed 107 Facebook accounts, 58 Pages, and 34 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against [coordinated inauthentic behavior](#). This domestic-focused network originated in Indonesia.**


The people behind this network used fake accounts — some of which had already been detected and disabled by our automated systems — to pose as locals in West Papua, post content and manage Pages. Most of this network’s ad accounts had already been detected and disabled by our automated system for violating our ad policies. The people behind this network posted primarily in Indonesian about political news and current events including separatist issues, the situation in West Papua, the 2020 regional elections and the presidential election in 2019, the coronavirus pandemic, and supportive commentary about the Indonesian government.

We found this activity as a result of our investigation into the suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region. Although the people behind this network attempted to conceal their identities, our investigation found links to individuals in Indonesia.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 107 Facebook accounts, 58 Pages, and 34 Instagram accounts.
- *Followers:* Around 156,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages and around 148,500 people followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.
- *Advertising:* Around \$85,500 in spending for ads on Facebook and Instagram paid for primarily in Indonesian rupiah.



Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these Pages and accounts:





### Translation:

Papuans support the extension of special autonomy



### Translation:

Caption: This world is a theater. Regional election is close, suddenly becomes a mastermind to find a stage. Till the labors/workers become puppets (are sacrificed). Do you know whose??? #thewishywashy #SaidIqbalsearchforastage #SpreadHoax #SacrificeLabors

Image overlay:

Using labors, Said Iqbal is ready to go to political stage

# 15

Originally announced on December 15, 2020

**We removed 84 Facebook accounts, 6 Pages, 9 Groups and 14 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against foreign interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign entity. This activity originated in France and targeted primarily the Central African Republic and Mali, and to a lesser extent Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Cote d'Ivoire and Chad.**

The people behind this activity used fake accounts — some of which had already been detected and disabled by our automated systems — to pose as locals in the countries they targeted, post, comment on content and manage Pages and Groups. They posted primarily in French and Arabic about news and current events including France's policies in Francophone Africa, the security situation in various African countries, claims of potential Russian interference in the election in the Central African Republic (CAR), supportive commentary about French military, and criticism of Russia's involvement in CAR. Some of these accounts also commented on the content that criticized France posted by one of the Russian operations.

We found this activity as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in Francophone Africa. Although the people behind it attempted to conceal their identities and coordination, our investigation found links to individuals associated with French military.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 84 Facebook accounts, 6 Pages, 9 Groups, and 14 accounts on Instagram.
- *Followers:* About 4,700 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, about 1,400 accounts joined one or more of these Groups and around 200 people followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these Pages and accounts:




**Translation:**

The Russian imperialists are a gangrene on Mali! Watch out for the tsarist lobotomy!




**Translation:**

The Russians have prohibited the family of Bokassa from gathering at the tomb of the deceased emperor. What kind of disrespect is that?



**Translation:**

#Africa - The French Development Agency announces the launch of the initiative "Covid-19 - Health in Common," of 1.2 billion euros by summer 2020, in response to the global health crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.



# 16

Originally announced on December 15, 2020

**We also removed 61 Facebook accounts, 29 Pages, 7 Groups and 1 Instagram account for [coordinated inauthentic behavior](#). This network originated in Russia and focused primarily on the Central African Republic (CAR), and to a lesser extent on Madagascar, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, South Africa, and the CAR diaspora in France.**

We identified several clusters of connected activity that relied on local nationals from Central African Republic and South Africa. This network used a combination of fake and compromised accounts — some of which had been already detected and disabled by our automated systems — to comment, amplify their own content, drive people to off-platform domains and run Groups and Pages posing as news and civic-focused entities. They also solicited content from local journalists. The people behind this activity took operational security steps to conceal their location and identity.


This network posted primarily in French, English, Portuguese and Arabic about news and current events, including covid-19 and the Russian vaccine against the virus, the upcoming election in CAR, terrorism, Russia's presence in Sub-Saharan Africa, supportive commentary about the CAR government, criticism of the French foreign policy, and a fictitious coup d'état in Equatorial Guinea. Some of these accounts commented on the content by the France-based CIB network described above, including in response to its criticism of Russia.

We found this activity as a result of our investigation into the suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior with links to the network we removed in October 2019. Our assessment benefited from information shared with us by researchers at Graphika. Although the people behind this campaign attempted to conceal their identities and coordination, our investigation found links to individuals associated with past activity by the Internet Research Agency (IRA) and previous

operations we attributed to entities associated with Russian financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin, who was indicted by the US Justice Department.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 61 Facebook accounts, 29 Pages, 7 Groups and 1 Instagram account.
- *Followers:* About 263,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, around 29,000 people joined one or more of these Groups, and 0 people followed this Instagram account.
- *Advertising:* About \$38,000 in spending for ads on Facebook and Instagram paid for primarily in South African rand and US dollars.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these Pages and accounts:







#### Translation:

Today is World Children's Day, and I would therefore like to thank President Touadera for everything he has done for our little Central Africans. I hope that thanks to his efforts to restore peace to the country, our children and the next generation will have a better life than those who saw the Central African Republic being ravaged by the tyrants. Pray for that 🙏🇷🇺



#### Translation:

Central African Republic at the moment when the Central African opponents are calling for a transition, the ANE announces the arrival of voter cards available for the entire territory.



## Translation:

"RCA-TRANSPORT: THE HEAD OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATE, PROFESSOR ARCHANGE-FAUSTIN TOUADERA TAKES PART IN THE INAUGURATION OF BARC

By centrafrik-infos

Bangui on December 04, 2020

The Central African Head of State, Professor Archanges-Faustin TOUADERA participated in the inauguration of BARC after several months of work. Note that after the appointment of SANI YALO at the head of BARC, the image of this building which was once far from bearing the name "BARC" changed at the halt.

Note also that before SANI -YALO is appointed at the head of this building, BARC has a revenue of 83 million and a debt of 3 billion CFA francs. But with SANI YALO, this building is rehabilitated and modernized with an order for several trucks (200) which will be delivered in the days to come ...

'The Central African Head of State, Professor Archange-Faustin TOUADERA has only one option, to give the chance to those who have the will to move the Central African Republic forward to update their thoughts on advancement.

# 17

Originally announced on December 15, 2020

**We also removed 197 Facebook accounts, 122 Page, 16 Group and 15 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against [foreign interference](#) which is [coordinated inauthentic behavior](#) on behalf of a foreign entity. This network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Libya, Sudan, and Syria.**

We identified several decentralized clusters of activity that relied on local nationals from Libya, Egypt, Sudan and Syria. This operation used fake accounts — many of which had been detected and removed by our automated systems at the time of creation or soon thereafter — to post in Groups, amplify the off-platform domains posing as news outlets, evade enforcement, and manage Pages masquerading as news entities and military-affiliated entities in Libya. These accounts posed as locals based in the countries they targeted. Some of these Pages went through significant name changes over time.

The people behind this activity posted primarily in Arabic about regional news and events, including misinformation; supportive commentary about Khalifa Haftar, head of the Libyan National Army, the Libyan army, and Saif Islam Gaddafi; and criticism of Turkey, Muslim Brotherhood, the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord and the peace talks at the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in Tunisia.

We found this activity as a result of our proactive internal investigation into the suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region — with some limited links to the networks we removed in October 2019. Our assessment benefited from public reporting by the Stanford Internet Observatory on a portion of this activity. Although the people behind this activity attempted to conceal their identity and coordination, our investigation found links to individuals associated with past activity by the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA).

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 197 Facebook accounts, 122 Page, 16 Group and 15 Instagram accounts

- **Followers:** About 5.7 million accounts followed one or more of these Pages, 64,500 accounts joined one or more of these Groups and about 99,500 people followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.
- **Advertising:** Around \$186,000 in spending for ads on Facebook paid for primarily in US dollars and rubles.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these Pages and accounts:



#### Translation:

Both captions: "Lavrov shows that the American presence impedes Syria's unity."



#### Translation:

"Establishing a Russian military post near the town of Ain-Issa to block the path for any possible Turkish attack"



### Translation:

The spokesman for the Libyan Arab Armed Forces, Major General Ahmed Al-Mismari, confirmed Tuesday that his country is at war with Turkey, and that it is a real showdown exacerbated by the Turkish fool, Erdogan.