Fix mergeWith prototype pollution - #6002
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Mo Jazayeri (mojaza) wants to merge 1 commit into
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Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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Summary
Fixes a prototype pollution vulnerability in
Objects.mergeWith()when merging attacker-controlled objects, including values produced byJSON.parse().Previously, a source property named
__proto__caused the merge to read the inheritedObject.prototypevalue from the target and recursively merge into it. This could add attacker-controlled properties to every ordinary object in the process.Details
__proto__withObject.defineProperty()so it becomes an ordinary own data property instead of invoking the legacy prototype setter.nullvalues.@rushstack/node-core-library.The change intentionally prevents merges from mutating objects reachable only through the target's prototype chain. This is the security boundary needed to prevent prototype pollution and should not affect normal merges of own properties.
How it was tested
JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"polluted":true}}')and verified thatObject.prototyperemains unchanged while the target receives a safe own__proto__property.rush test --to @rushstack/node-core-librarysuccessfully.